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While barriers to trade in most goods and some services including capital 
flows have been reduced considerably over the past two decades, many remain. Such 
policies harm most the economies imposing them, but the worst of the merchandise 
barriers (in agriculture and textiles) are particularly harmful to the world‘s poorest 
people, as are barriers to worker migration across borders. This paper focuses on how 
costly those anti-poor trade policies are, and examines possible strategies to reduce 
remaining distortions. Two opportunities in particular are addressed: completing the 
Doha Development Agenda process at the World Trade Organization (WTO), and 
freeing up the international movement of workers. A review of the economic benefits 
and adjustment costs associated with these opportunities provides the foundation to 
undertake benefit/cost analysis required to rank this set of opportunities against those 
aimed at addressing the world‘s other key challenges as part of the Copenhagen 
Consensus project. The paper concludes with key caveats and suggests that taking up 
these opportunities could generate huge social benefit/cost ratios that are considerably 
higher than the direct economic ones quantified in this study, even without factoring 
in their contribution to alleviating several of the other challenges identified by that 
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The net economic and social benefits of reducing most government subsidies and 
opening economies to trade are enormous relative to the costs of adjustment to such 
policy reform. While barriers to trade in most goods and some services including 
capital flows have been reduced considerably over the past two decades, many 
remain. Such policies harm most the economies imposing them, but the worst of the 
merchandise barriers (in agriculture and textiles) are particularly harmful to the 
world‘s poorest people, as are barriers to worker migration across borders. Addressing 
this challenge would therefore also assist in meeting several of the other challenges 
identified in this project including malnutrition, disease, poor education and air 
pollution.  
This paper focuses on how costly those anti-poor trade policies are, and 
examines possible strategies to reduce remaining distortions. Three opportunities in 
particular are addressed. The most beneficial prospect is the Doha Development 
Agenda of the World Trade Organization (WTO). If that proves to be too difficult 
politically to bring to a conclusion in the near future, the other two prospects we 
consider are sub-global preferential reforms such as the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) initiative, and the freeing up the international movement of 
workers.  
The paper begins by defining the challenge. It then summarizes the arguments 
for removing trade and migration distortions, along with critiques by sceptics, before 
discussing the various opportunities for reducing subsidies and trade barriers and 
explaining why we choose to focus on the above-mentioned three. The core of the 
paper is in the next two sections, which review the economic benefits and adjustment 
costs associated with these three opportunities. That provides the foundation to 
undertake the benefit/cost analysis required to allow this set of opportunities to be 
ranked against those aimed at addressing the world‘s other key challenges. The paper 
concludes with key caveats that suggest that taking up these opportunities could 
generate social benefit/cost ratios that are considerably higher than the direct 
economic ones quantified in this study, not least because they would also go some 






Despite the net economic and social benefits of reducing most government subsidies
1 
and barriers to international trade and migration, almost every national government 
intervenes in markets for goods, services, capital and labor in ways that distort 
                                                 
1 Not all subsidies are welfare-reducing, and in some cases a subsidy-cum-tax will be optimal to 
overcome a gap between private and social costs that cannot be bridged à la Coase (1960). Throughout 
this paper all references to ‗cutting subsidies‘ refer to bringing them back to their optimal level (which 





international commerce. To keep the task manageable, the policy instruments 
considered will be limited to those trade-related ones over which a government‘s 
international trade negotiators have some influence both at home and abroad, plus 
immigration numbers. That thereby excludes measures such as generic taxes on 
income, consumption and value added, government spending on mainstream public 
services, infrastructure and generic social safety nets in strong demand by the 
community, and subsidies (taxes) and related measures set optimally from the national 
viewpoint to overcome positive (negative) environmental or other externalities. Also 
excluded from consideration here are policies affecting markets for foreign exchange. 
This challenge in its modern form has been with us for about 75 years. The 
latter part of the nineteenth century saw a strong movement toward laissez faire and 
widespread international migration, but that development was reversed following the 
first world war in ways that contributed to the Great Depression of the early 1930s 
and the conflict that followed (Kindleberger 1989). It was during the second world 
war, in 1944, that a conference at Bretton Woods proposed an International Trade 
Organization. An ITO charter was drawn up by 1947 along with a General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but the ITO idea died when the United States failed to 
progress it through Congress (Diebold 1952). Despite that, the GATT came into being 
from 1948 and during its 47-year history (before it was absorbed into the WTO on 1 
January 1995) oversaw the gradual lowering of many tariffs on imports of most 
manufactured goods by governments of high-income countries. Manufacturing tariffs 
remained high in developing countries, however, and distortionary subsidies and trade 
policies affecting agricultural, textile, and services markets of both rich and poor 
countries, plus immigrations restrictions, continued to hamper efficient resource 
allocation, consumption choices, economic growth and poverty alleviation.  
The GATT‘s Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations led to 
agreements signed in 1994 that contributed to trade liberalization over the subsequent 
10 years. But even when those agreements were fully implemented by early 2005, and 
despite additional unilateral trade liberalizations since the 1980s by a number of 
countries (particularly developing and transition economies), many subsidies and 
trade and migration restrictions remained. They include not just trade taxes-cum-
subsidies but also contingent protection measures such as anti-dumping, regulatory 
standards that can be technical barriers to trade, and domestic producer subsidies 
(allegedly decoupled from production in the case of some farm support programs in 
high-income countries, but in fact only partially so). Insufficient or excessive taxation 
or quantitative regulations in the presence of externalities such as environmental or 
food safety risks also lead to inefficiencies and can be trade distorting. Furthermore, 
the on-going proliferation of preferential trading and bilateral or regional integration 
arrangements – for which there would be far less need in the absence of high barriers 
to trade and migration– is adding complexity to international economic relations. In 
some cases those arrangements are leading to trade and investment diversion rather 
than creation, changes that may be welfare reducing for some economies. 
The reluctance to reduce trade distortions is almost never because such policy 
reform involves government treasury outlays. On the contrary, except in the case of a 
handful of low-income countries still heavily dependent on trade taxes for 
government revenue, such reform may well benefit the treasury (by raising income or 
consumption/value added tax revenues more than trade tax revenues fall, not to 
mention any payments foregone because of cuts to subsidy programs). Rather, trade 
distortions and barriers to immigration remain largely because further liberalization 





government fear would reduce their chances of remaining in power (and possibly their 
own wealth in countries where corruption is rife). The challenge involves finding 
politically attractive ways to phase out remaining distortions to world markets for 
goods and services, including for the capital and labour used to produce those 
products.  
This challenge is even greater now than it was in the inaugural Copenhagen 
Consensus project four years ago. One reason is that the WTO membership is 
struggling to address the Doha Development Agenda that was launched in the 
immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001 – a time when there was much more 
goodwill to cooperate multilaterally than seems to be the case now. Another reason is 
greater doubts about the wisdom in predominantly Christian western countries of 
allowing more immigrants from Moslem countries where recent global terrorism 
seems to have emerged. More generally, this is but part of a broader disenchantment 
with globalization that could result not just in a failure to reach agreement under the 
Doha round to multilaterally liberalize trade, but also in the raising of current trade 
and immigration barriers. Such a reversal of past reforms could do huge damage to 
the global trading system and raise global inequality. That suggests the counterfactual 
to opening markets is not the status quo but something potentially much worse than 
the present. 
Evidence of anti-globalization sentiment abounds despite the lowered 
frequency and ferocity of public protests of the sort first seen at the WTO‘s Trade 
Ministerial in Seattle in 1999 and annual meetings on the World Bank and IMF early 
this decade.
2 One recent example is a Financial Times/Harris poll in the United States 
and the five largest European countries, where those polled were nearly three times 
more likely to say globalization was having a negative rather than a positive effect on 
their countries (Giles 2007). Such attitudes contributed to the decision at the June 
2007 Summit of EU leaders to bend to France‘s demand to drop the principle of free 
and undistorted competition from the treaty that, if ratified, will replace the EU 
constitution that was voted down by French and Dutch voters in 2005. Another 
example is the threat by members of the US congress to impose arbitrary trade 
barriers on products flooding in from China and to oppose liberal trade initiatives by 
the Bush Administration (e.g., for several bilateral free-trade agreements and for 
comprehensive immigration reform).  
These and similar examples underscore the need to re-emphasize the virtues of  
a more open global trading system – a system to which around 70 additional 
developing and transition economies have subscribed since the WTO came into being 
in 1995, with a further 28 (including Russia) currently striving to join. The case needs 
to be made within the context of the on-going information and communication 
technology (ICT) revolution that is globalizing the world‘s economies ever-more 
rapidly
3 and, via the internet, exposing differences in living standards to ever-more 
                                                 
2 That clash between the key international financial institutions and civil society groups is ironic since 
both seek the same outcome, namely a reduction in global poverty. As pointed out by Kanbur (2001), 
this common goal suggest there is much scope for the two groups to discuss their differences in views 
as to the best means to that end. And indeed they have been in much closer dialogue in recent years, a 
result of which has been some convergence of views on the policy reforms needed to promote pro-poor 
economic development. 
3 So rapid is this phenomenon that one author has felt the need to revise his popular book on the subject 
three times in three years (Friedman 2007). Its influence on fragmenting the process of production has 
been sufficiently profound for economists to begin developing a theory of trade in ‗tasks‘, to capture 
the fact that firms are offshoring an increasing array of their activities (e.g., Grossman and Rossi-





people in developing countries and thereby raising demands for an easing of 
restrictions on international migration.  
 
 
Arguments for Reducing Trade Distortions and Migration Barriers 
 
Even before examining the empirical estimates of the benefits and costs of grasping 
various trade- and migration-liberalizing opportunities, the case can be made that such 
reform in principle is beneficial economically.
4 It then remains to examine whether 
particular reforms are also positive or negative in terms of net social and 
environmental outcomes. The latter cannot be dealt with here in the same depth as the 
narrower economic analysis, but it is important because there are many who believe 
or assume the net social and environmental consequences are sufficiently negative as 
to outweigh the net economic benefits of market opening. We begin with the static 
and then dynamic gains from trade arguments and then turn briefly to the economic 
effects of international migration of workers. 
 
Static economic gains from own-country trade and subsidy reform 
 
The standard comparative static analysis of national gains from international trade 
emphasizes the economic benefits from production specialization and exchange so as 
to exploit comparative advantage in situations where a nation‘s costs of production 
and/or preferences differ from those in the rest of the world. This is part of the more 
general theory of the welfare effects of distortions in a trading economy, as 
summarized by Bhagwati (1971). Domestic industries become more productive on 
average as those with a comparative advantage expand by drawing resources from 
those previously protected or subsidized industries that grow slower or contract 
following reform. The gains from opening an economy are larger, the greater the 
variance of rates of protection among industries – especially within a sector, insofar as 
resources are more mobile within than between sectors (Lloyd 1974). Likewise, the 
more productive domestic firms within industries expand by drawing resources from 
less productive firms that contract or go out of business. Indeed theory and empirical 
studies suggest the shifting of resources within an industry may be more welfare-
improving than shifts between industries.
5 
The static gains from trade tend to be greater as a share of national output the 
smaller the economy, particularly where economies of scale in production have not 
been fully exploited and where consumers (including firms importing intermediate 
inputs) value variety so that intra- as well as inter-industry trade can flourish. Less-
than-full exploitation of scale economies is often the result of imperfect competition 
being allowed to prevail in the domestic marketplace, which again is more common in 
smaller and poorer economies where industries have commensurately smaller 
numbers of firms. This is especially the case in the service sector. One example is 
sub-sectors such as utilities, where governments have been inclined to sanction 
                                                 
4 This survey does not pretend to provide a comprehensive coverage of the gains-from-trade theory, 
and is even more limited in covering the economics of international migration. For more trade theory, 
readers are referred to the handbooks by Grossman and Rogoff (1995) and Harrigan and Choi (2003) 
and the new textbook by Feenstra (2004). For a survey of the economics of migration, see for example 
Borjas (1994) and Faini, de Melo and Zimmermann (1999). 






6 The gain comes from firms having to reduce their mark-ups in 
the face of greater competition. 
Those gains from opening up will be even greater if accompanied by a freeing 
up of domestic markets and the market for currency exchange. The more stable is 
domestic macroeconomic policy, the more attractive will an economy be to capital 
inflows. And the more domestic microeconomic policies are friendly to markets and 
competition for goods, services and productive factors, the greater the likelihood that 
adjustments by firms and consumers to trade liberalization will lead to a more-
efficient utilization of national resources and greater economic welfare (Corden 
1997). If domestic policy reforms included improving the government‘s capacity to 
redistribute income and wealth more efficiently and in ways that better matched 
society‘s wishes, concerns about the distributional consequences of trade 
liberalization also would be lessened. 
With the vastly increased scope during the past decade to separate in time and 
space the various productive tasks along each value chain, thanks to the ICT 
revolution, firms are increasingly able to take advantage of factor cost differences 
across countries for specific tasks without having to sacrifice gains from product 
specialization or move the whole of their production operation offshore (Hanson, 
Mataloni and Slaughter 2005). Trade in many tasks (e.g., emailing data files) is not 
even recorded in official trade statistics and so is not directly subject to trade policies. 
That suggests the variance of import protection across all traded items is even greater 
than across just recorded trade in goods, so the welfare gains from reducing the latter 
could well be greater than that captured by conventional trade models. 
 
Dynamic economic gains from own-country trade and subsidy reform 
 
To the standard comparative static analysis needs to be added links between trade and 
economic growth. The mechanisms by which openness contributes to growth are 
gradually getting to be better understood by economists, thanks to the pioneering 
work of such theorists as Grossman and Helpman (1991), Rivera-Batiz and Romer 
(1991) and the literature those studies spawned, including econometric papers based 
on firm-level databases. Channels through which openness to trade can affect an 
economy‘s growth rate include the scale of the market when knowledge is embodied 
in the products traded, the degree of redundant knowledge creation that is avoided 
through openness, and the effect of knowledge spillovers (Romer 1994, Taylor 1999, 
Acharya and Keller 2007).  
The dynamic gains from openness can be greater when accompanied by 
reductions in domestic distortions. As one example, Helpman and Itskhoki (2007) 
develop a two-country two-sector model of international trade in which one sector 
produces homogeneous products while the other, which produces differentiated 
products, has firm heterogeneity, monopolistic competition, search and matching in 
its labor market, and wage bargaining (so that some of the workers searching for jobs 
end up being unemployed). The two countries are similar except for frictions in their 
labor markets. They show that both countries gain from trade but that the country with 
lower labor market frictions gains proportionately more, and that its flexible labor 
market confers comparative advantage: the flexible country is a net exporter of 
differentiated products. Either country benefits by lowering frictions in its labor 
                                                 
6 The argument for allowing such monopolies is that they could provide greater technical efficiency via 
their larger scale. The contrary argument is that, being sheltered from competition, they fall so short of 





market, but that harms the other country; but a simultaneous proportional lowering of 
labor market frictions in both countries benefits both of them. With trade integration 
both countries benefit (even though it may raise their rates of unemployment), but the 
flexible country has higher total factor productivity in this model. 
When that trade reform includes financial markets, more is gained than just a 
lower cost of credit. The resulting financial deepening can stimulate growth too 
(Townsend and Ueda 2007). Prasad et al. (2006) add two other indirect growth-
enhancing benefits of financial reform: they discipline firms to look after the interests 
of shareholders better and they discipline governments to provide greater 
macroeconomic stability. 
Importantly from a policy maker‘s viewpoint, the available empirical evidence 
strongly supports the view that open economies grow faster (see the surveys by 
USITC 1997, Winters 2004, Billmeier and Nannicini 2007 and Francois and Martin 
2007). Notable early macroeconometric studies of the linkage between trade reform 
and the rate of economic growth include those by Sachs and Warner (1995) and 
Frankel and Romer (1999). More-recent studies also provide some indirect supportive 
econometric evidence. For example, freeing up the importation of intermediate and 
capital goods promotes investments that increase growth (Wacziarg 2001). Indeed, the 
higher the ratio of imported to domestically produced capital goods for a developing 
country, the faster it grows (Lee 1995; Mazumdar 2001). Greater openness to 
international financial markets also boosts growth via the stimulation to investment 
that more risk-sharing generates. 
Rodrigeuz and Rodrik (2001) examine a number of such studies and claim the 
results they surveyed are not robust. However, in a more recent study that revisits the 
Sachs and Warner data and then provides new time-series evidence, Wacziarg and 
Welch (2003) show that dates of trade liberalization do characterize breaks in 
investment and GDP growth rates. Specifically, for the 1950-1998 period, countries 
that have liberalized their trade (raising their trade-to-GDP ratio by an average of 5 
percentage points) have enjoyed on average 1.5 percentage points higher GDP growth 
compared with their pre-reform rate.  
There have also been myriad case studies of liberalization episodes. In a 
survey of 36 of them, Greenaway (1993) reminds us that many things in addition to 
trade policies were changing during the studied cases, so ascribing causality is not 
easy. That, together with some econometric studies that fail to find that positive link, 
led Freeman (2004) to suggest the promise of raising the rate of economic growth 
through trade reform has been overstated. But the same could be (and has been) said 
about the contributions to growth of such things as investments in education, health, 
agricultural research, and so on (Easterly 2001). A more-general and more-robust 
conclusion that Easterly draws from empirical evidence, though, is that people 
respond to incentives. Hence getting incentives right in factor and product markets is 
crucial – and removing unwarranted subsidies and trade barriers is an important part 
of that process. Additional evidence from 13 new case studies reported in Wacziarg 
and Welch (2003) adds further empirical support to that view, as does the fact that 
there are no examples of autarkic economies that have enjoyed sustained economic 
growth, in contrast to the many examples since the 1960s of reformed economies that 
boomed after opening up. 
Specifically, economies that commit to less market intervention tend to attract 
more investment funds, ceteris paribus, which raise their stocks of capital (through 
greater aggregate global savings or at the expense of other economies‘ capital stocks). 





1990s fostered inward foreign investment (and both had a positive impact on 
investment in education) while backtracking on trade reform had a negative impact on 
foreign investment. More-open economies also tend to be more innovative, because of 
greater trade in intellectual capital (a greater quantity and variety of information, ideas 
and technologies, sometimes but not only in the form of purchasable intellectual 
property associated with product and process innovations), and because greater 
competition spurs innovation (Aghion and Griffith 2005; Aghion and Howitt 2006) ), 
leading to higher rates of capital accumulation and productivity growth (Lumenga-
Neso, Olarreaga and Schiff 2005).
7 
A growing body of industry studies, including ones based on firm-level survey 
data that capture the reality of firm heterogeneity, provides additional support for the 
theory that trade reform boosts the rate of productivity growth.
8 It appears more-
productive firms are innately better at exporting, so opening an economy leads to their 
growth and the demise of the least-productive firms (Bernard et al. 2007). That leads 
to better exploitation of comparative advantage in terms not only of industries but also 
of firms within each industry. If those more-productive firms are also foreign owned, 
as is clearly the case in China (Whalley 2006), then being open to FDI multiplies the 
gains from product trade openness. And if those foreign firms are involved in 
retailing, and they enter a country with suppliers whose productivity is below best-
practise, they can put pressure on those suppliers to raise their productivity (and 
perhaps alert them as to ways to do that). Walmart‘s influence in Mexico provides one 
example of this force at work (Javorcik, Keller and Tybout 2006). Furthermore, if the 
foreign firms are supplying lower-cost services inputs into manufacturing, that can 
boost the productivity growth of local manufacturers using those service inputs, 
according to a recent study of the Czech Republic (Arnold, Javorcik and Mattoo 
2006).
9 
It need not be just the most-productive firms that engage in exporting. For 
lower-productivity firms, incurring the fixed costs of investing in newly opened 
foreign markets may be justifiable if accompanied by the larger sales volumes that 
come with exporting. Lower foreign tariffs will induce these firms to simultaneously 
export and invest in productivity (while inducing higher-productivity firms to export 
without more investing, as in Melitz 2003). Lileeva and Trefler (2007) model this 
econometrically using a heterogeneous response model. Unique 'plant-specific' 
tariff cuts serve as their instrument for the decision of Canadian plants to start 
exporting to the United States. They find that those lower-productivity Canadian 
plants that were induced by the tariff cuts to start exporting increased their labor 
productivity, engaged in more product innovation, and had high adoption rates of 
advanced manufacturing technologies. These new exporters also increased their 
domestic (Canadian) market share at the expense of non-exporters, which suggests 
that the labor productivity gains reflect underlying gains in total factor productivity.  
In short, trade liberalization can lead not just to a larger capital stock and a 
one-off increase in productivity but also to higher rates of capital accumulation and 
productivity growth in the reforming economy because of the way reform energizes 
entrepreneurs. For those higher growth rates to be sustained, though, there is 
widespread agreement that governments also need to (a) have in place effective 
institutions to efficiently allocate and protect property rights, (b) allow domestic 
                                                 
7 More open economies also tend to be less vulnerable to foreign shocks such as sudden stops in capital 
inflows, currency crashes and severe recessions (Frankel and Cavallo 2004). 
8 For an overview of this new theory, see Helpman, Marin and Verdier (2008).  





factor and product markets to function freely, and (c) maintain macroeconomic and 
political stability (Rodrik 2003; Wacziarg and Welch 2003; Baldwin 2004; Chang, 
Kaltani and Loayza 2005).  
Perhaps the best single paper that brings these ideas together using a numerical 
open economy growth model is that by Rutherford and Tarr (2002). Their model 
allows for product variety, imperfect competition, economies of scale and 
international capital flows. It is dynamic, so the model can trace out an adjustment 
path to trade reform; and it is stochastic in that it draws randomly from uniform 
probability distributions for eight key parameters of the model. They simulate a 
halving of the only policy intervention (a 20 percent tariff on imports) and, in doing 
so, fully replace the government‘s lost tariff revenue with a lump-sum tax. That 
modest trade reform produces a welfare increase (in terms of Hicksian equivalent 
variation) of 10.6 percent of the present value of consumption in their central model. 
Systematic sensitivity analysis with 34,000 simulations showed that there is virtually 
no chance of a welfare gain of less than 3 percent, and a 7 percent chance of a welfare 
gain larger than 18 percent of consumption. Several modeling variants and sensitivity 
analysis on all the key parameters found that the welfare estimates for the same 10 
percentage point tariff cut ranged up to 37 percent when international capital flows 
are allowed, and down to 4.7 percent when using the most inefficient replacement tax 
(a tax of capital). The latter result shows that even the very inefficient tax on capital is 
superior to the tariff as a revenue raiser. Increasing the size of the tariff cuts results in 
roughly proportional increases in the estimated welfare gains. Large welfare gains in 
the model arise because the economy benefits from increased varieties of foreign 
goods, which dominate the decrease in varieties of domestic goods. In order to assess 
the importance of variety gains, they then assume that one of the two sectors is subject 
to constant returns to scale and perfect competition (CRS/PC) – and find in that case 
that the additional varieties do not increase total factor productivity. Instead, a small 
welfare gain of about 0.5 percent of the present value of consumption emerges, which 
is of the same order of magnitude as in the many comparative static CRS/PC 
computable general equilibrium studies. Their results also illustrate the importance of 
complementary reforms to fully realize the potential gains from trade reform. In 
particular, with the ability to access international capital markets the gains are roughly 
tripled; and use of inefficient replacement taxes significantly reduce the gains. These 
combined results underscore the point that complementary macroeconomic, 
regulatory, and financial market reforms to allow capital flows and efficient alternate 
tax collection are crucial to realizing the potentially large gains from trade 
liberalization. 
   
 
Economic consequences of international migration 
 
Half a century ago it was shown, using the simplest of trade models, that trade in 
products could be a perfect substitute for trade in capital and labour (Mundell 1957). 
But increasingly it has become apparent that trade in factors of production can 
complement trade in goods, in which case freeing both would yield greater gains 
(Markusen 1983). Indeed theory cannot predict whether that would result in factor 
trade increasing more or less than product trade (Michaely 2003), which suggests the 
greatest gains would come to those countries that open both. Certainly the two forces 
happened simultaneously in the latter nineteenth century in what might be considered 





political difficulties, there is all the more reason to expect gains from liberalizing 
international migration of workers, thereby bringing about greater wage equality 
across countries. By strengthening social and business networks across borders, 
migrants can lower the cost of and improve the quality of information on 
opportunities for trade and investment. 
  The economic consequences even at the country level are somewhat more 
complicated for worker flows than for product flows between nations, because the 
one-to-one correspondence between people and countries is disturbed. Perhaps the 
simplest way to deal with that is to consider the welfare of the new migrants 
separately from that of the host country‘s other residents and the remaining source 
country residents. But if new migrants repatriate a significant share of their earning 
from the host country to the source country, that will boost economic welfare of those 
remaining in the developing country. And if new migrant workers are more able to 
compete with earlier migrants than with locally born workers in the host country, 
those communities need to be separately identified too. 
 
 
Opportunities for Reducing Barriers to Trade and Migration 
 
Among the more-feasible opportunities available today for encouraging trade 
negotiations to stimulate significant market opening and subsidy cuts, the most 
obvious is a non-preferential legally binding partial reform following the WTO‘s 
current round of multilateral trade negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA).  
A second type of trade negotiating opportunity involving a subset of the 
world‘s economies is a reciprocal preferential agreement.
10 Efforts are also being 
made to negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which potentially 
would bring together all the economies of North, Central and South America. This is 
perhaps the largest reciprocal preferential agreement currently in prospect, and dwarfs 
the bilateral FTA negotiations and discussions the US and EU are each having with a 
range of other countries.
11 It is examined both without and with the prospect of an 
EU-Mercosur FTA.  
There is also the opportunity for other high-income countries to follow the EU 
offer to Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) and African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) small countries of duty-free access to their markets, but this opportunity 
involves only a very small volume of global trade (and may well cause losses for 
other poor countries that are not LDCs or ACPs, so could even worsen inequality 
among low-income countries), so estimates of its benefits are mentioned just in 
passing. 
A more radical opportunity is considered instead, namely the freeing up of 
international flows of workers. Even though the WTO‘s current DDA could include it 
as part of the services (GATS Mode IV) negotiations (see Mattoo and Carzaniga 
2002), it appears to have little prospect of being adopted multilaterally in this current 
round of negotiations. However, individual countries could adopt it unilaterally with 
                                                 
10 Whether such preferential trade agreements are stepping stones or stumbling blocks to freer global 
trade is a much-debated point among economists. For a recent survey of the impact of regionalism on 
the multilateral trading system, see Baldwin (2008). 
11 A potentially larger FTA is that among members of APEC (the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 





the stroke of the legislators‘ pen. Hence it is considered separately from the first 
opportunity described above. 
 
 
Economic Effects of Current Trade Barriers and Farm Subsidies 
 
All the estimates considered below of the potential economic welfare gains from these 
opportunities are generated using computable general equilibrium (CGE) models of 
the global economy, the most common of which (GTAP) is described in the 
Appendix. The CGE welfare gains refer to the equivalent variation in income (EV) as 
a result of each of the shocks described.
12 While not without their shortcomings (see 
Francois 2000, Whalley 2000, Anderson 2003 and the caveats below), CGE models 
are far superior for current purposes to partial equilibrium models, which fail to 
capture the economy-wide nature of the adjustments to reform whereby some sectors 
expand when others contract and release capital and labor. They are also superior to 
macroeconometric models which typically lack sufficient sectoral detail and are based 
on time series analysis of the past which may no longer be relevant for the near future 
(Francois and Reinert 1997). CGE models were first used in multilateral trade reform 
analysis in ex post assessments of the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations in the late 
1970s/early 1980s (Cline et al. 1978; Deardorff and Stern 1979, 1986; Whalley 1985). 
Since then they have been used increasingly during and following the Uruguay 
Round, as well as for ex ante assessments of the Doha Round, of bilateral and other 
preferential economic integration agreements, and of unilateral reforms such as when 
a country considers acceding to the WTO. 
Empirical comparative static economy-wide CGE model simulations of the 
potential economic welfare gains from prospective multilateral trade liberalization 
typically generate positive gains for the world and for most participating countries. In 
the case of sub-global preferential trade reform studies, the estimated gains to the 
countries involved are always smaller, and some excluded countries – and even some 
participating ones – may lose. When increasing returns to scale and monopolistic 
competition (IRS/MC) are assumed instead of constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition (CRS/PC), and firms are assumed to be heterogeneous rather than 
homogeneous, and when trade is liberalized not just in goods but also in services and 
investment flows, the estimates of potential gains can increase several fold. Economy-
wide modelers have also begun to examine the effects of lowering barriers to 
temporary labor movements across national borders. Virtually all such studies are in 
comparative static mode however, and so are unable to capture the crucially important 
growth-enhancing dynamic effects of trade reform described in the previous section. 
It is therefore not surprising that they generate results for gains from trade reform that 
are only a small fraction of GDP. 
Such low estimated gains seem to fly in the face of casual empiricism. Irwin 
(2002), for example, notes that three different countries in three different regions 
chose to liberalize in three different decades (Korea from 1965, Chile from 1974 and 
India from 1991 – see Irwin 2002, Figures 2.3 to 2.5), and per capita GDP growth in 
each of those countries accelerated markedly thereafter by several percentage points 
per year. Admittedly those historical liberalization experiences involved also 
                                                 
12 EV is defined as the income that consumers would be willing to forego and still have the same level 
of well-being after as before the reform. For a discussion of the merits of EV versus other measures of 





complementary reforms to other domestic policies and institutions that would have 
contributed significantly to the observed boosts in economic growth. Even so, they 
support the point made in the previous section that trade can generate not only static 
efficiency gains but also dynamic gains.  
Some CGE modellers have tried to proxy that dynamic effect by adding an 
additional one-off total factor productivity shock to their trade reform scenarios. But 
reform may also raise the rate of factor productivity growth and/or of capital 
accumulation. Such endogenous growth has yet to be satisfactorily introduced into 
CGE models, and in any case it is unclear how to interpret a model‘s estimated 
welfare effects if households are reducing current consumption in order to boost their 
or their descendents‘ future consumption by investing more. 
It should be kept in mind that all the experiments in the comparative static 
CGE studies surveyed below reduce only trade barriers plus agricultural production 
and export subsidies. The reasons for including subsidies only in agriculture are that 
they are the key subsidies explicitly being negotiated at the WTO (where non-
agricultural export subsidies are illegal), they represented an estimated two-fifths of 
all government expenditure on subsidies globally during 1994-98 (van Beers and de 
Moor 2001, Table 3.1), and they are fully represented in the GTAP database whereas 
subsidies for most other sectors are not included so it is not possible to estimate their 
welfare cost within the same framework. And the reason for not also explicitly 
estimating the welfare impacts of other domestic policies and institutions (even 
though, because of their complementarity, they can affect the payoff from opening up) 
is that typically they are beyond the sphere of influence of international trade 
negotiators.  
With this as background, we first consider estimates of the economic benefits 
associated with freeing global trade completely, before turning to each of the three 
opportunities for politically more feasible partial reforms. The reasons for reviewing 
gains from full trade reform are two-fold: because it provides a benchmark against 
which to compare the benefits of lesser reforms; and because several models have 
generated full global trade reform results,
13 making it possible to see the range of 
outcomes that emerge from these different models.  
 
Global cost of current distortions to international trade  
 
Estimates of the global cost of current trade distortions are obtained by simulating the 
removal of those policies as represented in a global CGE model. Table 1 reports a 
selection of estimates of the economic benefits associated with complete removal of 
goods trade barriers and agricultural production and export subsidies.  
The first one listed in Table 1 is by Anderson, Martin and van der 
Mensbrugghe (2006a,b). The AMV study provides the simplest scenario: full global 
liberalization of just merchandise trade and farm subsidies. It uses the latest version of 
the World Bank‘s Linkage model, assuming constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition in all product and factor markets.
14 The GTAP Version 6 database, which 
provides trade and protection data for 2001 (see Dimaranan 2006), is employed in that 
study to generate a new baseline for 2005 (allowing for recent policy changes 
                                                 
13 Full opening of borders to immigration would be such a huge shock, and so unlikely politically 
relative to opening product and capital markets, as to not worth considering.   
14 The Linkage Model is fully described by its creator (van der Mensbrugghe 2005). It is more of a 
long-run model than GTAP, having higher supply and trade elasticities, and it is recursive dynamic and 





including the completion of implementation of the Uruguay Round, the EU expansion 
to 25 members, and the accession of new members such as China and Taiwan to 
WTO), and then to project the world economy forward a decade assuming no further 
trade policy reforms. This baseline for 2015 is then compared with how it would look 
after full adjustment following the phased removal of all countries‘ trade barriers and 
agricultural subsidies from 2005. The economic welfare gain is estimated to be 
US$287 billion per year in 2001 dollars as of 2015 (and hence slightly more each year 
thereafter as the global economy expands). Of that, $86 billion p.a. is estimated to 
accrue to developing countries.  
These AMV results are the lowest of the estimates summarized in Table 1, and 
so should be considered as very much lower-bound estimates of the current cost of 
global distortions to international trade. But they have been widely used in the WTO‘s 
Doha Round as a measure of what is on the table for negotiation in the DDA‘s 
agricultural and NAMA (non-agricultural market access) talks, in part because they 
have also been carefully decomposed in various ways to illuminate the relative 
importance of the various issues under discussion (see below).  
The second study listed in Table 1, BKS, is by Brown, Kiyota and Stern 
(2005). It uses the Version 5 GTAP data base projected from its 1997 base to 2005, 
but they embed it in the authors‘ static Michigan Model of World Production and 
Trade (www.ssp.umich.edu/rsie/model) to produce the highest of the surveyed 
estimates of global welfare gains from complete removal of trade barriers and 
agricultural subsidies: $2,616 billion p.a. when converted in 2001 US dollars. This 
much larger estimate is the result of several features of the BKS study: having China 
and Taiwan‘s implementation of their WTO accession commitments in the 
experiment rather than in the baseline; the inclusion of increasing returns to scale and 
monopolistic competition (IRS/MC) for non-agricultural sectors and therefore product 
heterogeneity at the level of the firm rather than the national industry; liberalization of 
services in addition to goods trade (with IRS/MC assumed for the huge services 
sector); and the inclusion in services liberalization of the opening to foreign direct 
investment. The latter boosts substantially the gains from services liberalization, 
which account for nearly two-thirds of this study‘s estimated total gains. 
The other two estimates in Table 1 of the gains from complete trade 
liberalization are between these two extremes. The HRT study (Harrison, Rutherford 
and Tarr 2002) uses much larger trade elasticities than other models and so gets a 
considerable gain for goods trade reform ($514 billion compared with AMV‘s $287 
billion) even though it refers to 1995 when the world economy was somewhat 
smaller.  
The WBGEP study (World Bank 2002) uses the World Bank‘s Linkage model 
but the Version 5 GTAP protection levels as of 1997, before projecting the world 
economy to 2015. That WBGEP study differs from the AMV study not only in using 
an older protection database (as do the BKS and HRT studies) but also in assuming 
liberalization boosts factor productivity in each industry according to the extent of 
growth in the share of production exported by the industry. The case presented 
suggests the gains would be $901 billion p.a. when converted in 2001 US dollars. By 
way of comparison, AMV re-ran their more recent model with that same factor 
productivity multiplier, and it boosted their total global gains from $287 billion to 
$461 billion (Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 2006a, Table 12.20). The 
fact that this is barely half as large as the number in the WBGEP study has been the 
subject of much discussion, and led to a detailed explanation being provided by van 





new source of data on tariffs (which incorporated tariff preferences more 
comprehensively and hence lowered the average bilateral tariff) and on agricultural 
assistance (which on average implied less agricultural protectionism, and the 
incorporation of major reforms between 1997 and 2005 (most notably implementation 
of the Uruguay Round agreements, including the phase-out of the Multifibre 
Arrangement, EU expansion, and the reforms in China that accompanied its accession 
to WTO). On the one hand, the fact that this drop in the cost of remaining trade 
distortions was so large is worth celebrating, as it indicates the extent to which 
distortions in the world‘s markets for goods have been reduced in less than one 
decade. On the other hand, the cost of policies still in place remains huge, hence this 
paper‘s search for opportunities to bring about further liberalization. 
 
Which countries bear the cost, and which sectoral policies impose the cost? 
 
The AMV study has laid out how its estimated global cost of current policies affecting 
merchandise trade is distributed across countries and from which sectoral policies 
they originate. The basis of that is the estimated tariff structure of 2005, summarized 
in Table 2. It shows agricultural products are subject to much higher tariffs than 
manufactures, especially in high-income countries which also provide large subsidies 
to farmers. It also shows that tariffs in developing countries are much higher than in 
high-income countries for manufactures, and almost as high for farm products. From 
that one would expect developing countries to be imposing a high cost on themselves 
from their own policies, and agricultural policies to be a significant contributor to the 
global cost of merchandise trade distortions.  
The detailed country distribution of AMV‘s estimated welfare costs is 
provided in Table 3, where it is expressed as a gain from full liberalization. The real 
value in 2001 US dollars is shown in column 1, and it is subdivided in columns 2 and 
3 into that part due to the terms of trade effects of current policies (which for small 
countries in a homogeneous-products model would be equivalent to the effect of other 
countries‘ policies, but not in models using Armington trade elasticities that 
distinguish products by country of origin and so give each country some degree of 
market power internationally), and to the rest (which is predominantly due to own-
country policies). The bold rows towards the bottom of the table indicate for high-
income countries that one-seventh of the cost to them comes from the adverse terms 
of trade effects of global distortions, whereas for developing countries the opposite is 
true: global reform would worsen their terms of trade. Hence the difference between 
the two country groups in absolute cost of own-country policies is closer than the 
overall cost, although still higher for high-income countries. When expressed as a 
percentage of baseline income, however, the loss is greater for the developing country 
group, at 0.8 percent compared with 0.6 percent for high-income countries; and in so 
far as column 2 proxies the cost contribution of other countries‘ policies, then the 
final numbers in parentheses suggest developing countries‘ losses from policies of 
that country group are proportionately more than twice those of the much larger high-
income economies (1.1 compared with 0.5 percent) – which is consistent with the 
differences in average tariffs reported in Table 2. 
Table 4 summarizes how those costs are attributable to different sectors of the 
two country groups. Row 9 suggests that agricultural and food policies are responsible 
for 63 percent of the cost of merchandise trade distortions to both developing and 
high-income countries. That is, even though that sector represents only about one-





welfare loss from trade and subsidies affecting goods markets. Also, columns 4 and 5 
show that for developing countries the cost is split equally between policies of high-
income countries and those of developing countries, whereas for rich countries 58 
percent of the cost is from own-country and other rich countries‘ policies. 
Despite the large cost of agricultural policies to developing countries as a 
group, an important question was raised during and following the Copenhagen 
Consensus process in 2004 (Panagariya 2004). It was: wouldn‘t that cost be borne 
predominantly by relatively affluent agricultural exporters such as Argentina, Brazil 
and Thailand, while poorer developing countries such as in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
would be beneficiaries of current agricultural protection policies of high-income 
countries? SSA countries would be benefiting, so Panagariya‘s argument went, either 
as net food importers (since international food prices are depressed by rich-country 
agricultural protection) or as net agricultural exporters accessing (duty-free and often 
quota-free) those protected markets via preferential trade agreements such as enjoyed 
by former colonies or least-developed countries. The first part of the argument seems 
to be supported by column 2 of Table 3, which shows that Argentina, Brazil and 
Thailand – along with Australia and New Zealand – are the main losers from the 
terms of trade effects of current policies. But so too is the southern Africa region, 
while the rest of SSA benefits (i.e., would lose from full merchandise liberalization).  
To address Panagariya‘s question more fully requires restricting the 
experiment to just agricultural policies and of just high-income countries, and to 
decomposing the effects to see the contributions of agricultural versus non-
agricultural prices of imports versus exports. That has been since done in a paper by 
the same AMV authors and reported in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 reveals that indeed 
SSA‘s agricultural and food import price index rises, but so too does the export price 
index. Evidently the rise in demand for SSA exports enjoying little or no preferential 
access more than outweighs the reduced earnings from their exports that have been 
enjoying substantial preferences. But that is only half the story. The other half has to 
do with changes in prices of non-agricultural products. Table 5 shows that while the 
price of other imported goods rises slightly, because of growth in demand for relative 
to supply of them in high-income countries as their incomes rise, the price of SSA‘s 
exports of non-agricultural goods rises even more. The relative importance of each of 
these sets of price changes in contributing to the changes in regional economic 
welfare is summarized in Table 6, which reveals two things. First, the negative 
contribution to SSA welfare from higher import prices is more than offset by the 
positive contribution from higher export prices (except for farm products in South 
Africa where they almost cancel out). And second, the contributions on both the 
export and import side are larger from non-agricultural than from agricultural price 
changes. So even though the price changes shown in Table 5 for SSA from high-
income country agricultural liberalization are smaller for non-farm than farm 
products, the greater weight of non-farm products means their net positive welfare 
contribution to SSA via the terms of trade effect is greater.
15  
 
Within agriculture, which policy instruments reduce welfare most? 
 
As the WTO‘s Doha negotiations on agriculture got under way from late 2001, 
developing countries initially put most emphasis on the need to reduce agricultural 
                                                 
15 This is very similar to the result found by the OECD Secretariat using their version of the GTAP 
model known as GTAPEM, which is almost the same as the GTAP model referred to in the Appendix 





subsidies. So when an early draft of the Anderson and Martin (2006) book presented 
results suggesting those subsidies contributed little to the global welfare cost of 
agricultural policies relative to restrictions on market access (just 7 percent, compared 
with the 93 percent contribution of import tariffs), those CGE modeling results were 
treated with some scepticism.
16 To convince sceptics required examining the issue 
from first principles, to show that the 93 percent result – which is supported by the 
modeling studies of two other institutions (USDA 2001 and OECD 2006) – is not just 
an artifact of the computable general equilibrium models they use.
17 A study by 
Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela (2006) was designed to provide more intuition for 
this repeated research finding. To ensure transparency, it used widely available data 
and focused on a simple back-of-the-envelope model rather than a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model with its inherent complexities. Its results confirmed the 
overwhelming importance of market access found in the studies using CGE models. 
Despite these results, domestic support should not be ignored in the Doha 
negotiations, not least because it is extremely important for some products of great 
interest to developing countries. This is particularly so for cotton, where Anderson 
and Valenzuela (2007) estimate that abolishing domestic subsidies on cotton would 
provide almost 80 percent of the $147 million in total welfare gains to Sub-Saharan 
Africa from cotton market reform. There is also a systemic risk that restraints on 
market access barriers, if unaccompanied by restraints on domestic support, could 
lead some high-income countries to replace market access barriers with distorting 
domestic support. The key policy message to draw from these results, though, is that 
reductions in domestic support cannot, alone, be expected to realize very much of the 
potential global trade and welfare gains sought from the Doha agricultural 
negotiations, and that achieving improvements in market access is extremely 
important for a successful outcome in these negotiations.  
 
 
Quantifying Economic Benefits of Reducing Barriers to International 
Trade and Migration  
 
In the light of the above modeling results showing the costs of current policies, we 
focus now on assessing in turn the benefits from the three opportunities identified 
earlier in the paper to reduce those distortions, namely via the Doha Development 
Agenda of the World Trade Organization (WTO), via sub-global preferential trade 
reforms such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) initiative, and via 
allowing more international movement of workers.  
 
Prospective benefits from the Doha Development Agenda 
 
                                                 
16 One reason countries put different emphases on the three pillars, and perhaps a reason the EU seeks 
to downplay the importance of market access, is that a large share of support for its farmers – and most 
of its food processors – comes from market access barriers. By contrast, domestic support measures are 
much more important in the United States. 
17 Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2004), using a simpler partial equilibrium framework and extremely 
detailed information on tariffs plus official WTO data on domestic subsidies, also established the 
importance of agricultural market access barriers. Their findings were even stronger than the 93 percent 
result cited above. They found that reductions in domestic support would yield less than one percent of 





Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006a,b) examine in great detail the 
comparative static consequences of the main options that have been canvassed in the 
Doha Round. They show a range of global welfare gain estimates via partial goods 
trade liberalization from less than $20 billion to as much as $120 billion per year. In 
their ‗Pessimistic‘, minimalist-reform scenario, little more is achieved other than the 
phase out of farm export subsidies, a modest reduction in agricultural domestic 
support and, for agricultural and non-agricultural tariffs, a reduction only in ‗binding 
overhang‘ (the gap between each legally bound tariff and the typically much lower 
actual tariffs being applied to imports from different trading partners). The key aspect 
of this scenario is the inclusion of ‗sensitive‘ and ‗special‘ farm product exceptions in 
the tariff cutting formula, whereby virtually all the items with peak applied tariffs 
would avoid being cut in both high-income and developing countries. The first 
column of Table 7 shows that with such a minimalist outcome, developing countries 
as a group would gain nothing and high-income countries would gain just $18 billion 
per year by 2015 (in US 2001 dollars). This assumes also that Special and Differential 
Treatment (STD) is invoked, whereby developing countries cut their bound rates by 
only two-thirds as much as high-income countries (hence their applied rates by very 
little, given their high degree of ‗binding overhang‘), and UN-designated Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) don‘t liberalize at all. 
Having exposed the importance of ‗sensitive‘ and ‗special‘ farm product 
exception in this way, the hope is that negotiators will be more ambitious in the final 
agreement on agriculture, which in turn would allow a more-ambitious outcome for 
non-agriculture. When that exceptional treatment for agricultural tariffs is dropped 
and a 50 percent cut in non-agricultural tariffs is included, the projected developing 
country gain rises to almost $30 billion per year, and the high-income country gain 
quadruples (mainly because rich countries would be lowering their applied tariffs on 
their most protected items such as rice, sugar and dairy products). In this ‗central‘ 
scenario, the projected global gain is $96 billion per year in 2015, which is 0.2 percent 
of global GDP. 
If developing countries were to not invoke SDT, the probability of reaching a 
Doha agreement would rise substantially – and developing countries would gain much 
more, because of greater own-country reform. The final column of Table 7 shows that 
if developing countries (including LDCs) fully engaged in the sense of cutting their 
tariffs by the same proportion as high-income countries, their gain in this ‗Optimistic‘ 
scenario would rise by more than a third above that from the second (‗Central‘) 
scenario, and the global gains would be almost $120 billion per year (compare 
columns 2 and 3 of Table 7).  
The ‗Central‘ scenario is about mid-way between the various proposals that 
were on the table before the Doha round went quiet (Martin and Anderson 2006), so it 
is that one which is chosen as one around which we do benefit/cost analysis below. In 
July 2007 the Chairs of the Agricultural and the NAMA negotiations provided new 
texts for members to consider as they try to narrow their differences. True, many 
developing countries remained cautious about undertaking more liberalization 
commitments, and the fast track authority for the US President expired on 30 June 
2007, so agreement may yet prove elusive or still be some years away. But if a fair 
compromise between those current positions is reached, it would represent a 
substantial agreement—much more so than the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture in terms of cuts both in bound tariffs and subsidies and in actual delivered 
levels of farm protection and support. The potential Doha agreement on non-





trade reform is likely to be accompanied by an as-yet unknown degree of commitment 
to reform policies affecting markets for services, which would multiply the gains, 
possibly by several orders of magnitude based on the earlier discussion of results 
reported in Table 1. With that in mind, together with the fact that the numbers in 
Table 2 are generated from a model than does not include increasing returns to scale, 
imperfect competition, productivity enhancement or dynamics, the ‗Central‘ 
scenario‘s benefits (equal to 0.2 percent globally and 0.28 percent for developing 
countries) should be considered very much lower-bound estimates.  
As for an upper bound on comparative static gains, the results in Table 1 
suggest it could be as much as nine times greater, depending on the extent to which 
services trade and investment are also liberalized, on the strength of influence of 
imperfect competition and economies of scale, and on the extent to which the 
appropriate counterfactual in 2015 is not just current policies but rather more-
protectionist ones in the absence of a robust Doha agreement. To err on the 
conservative side, we choose an upper bound of five times the lower bound, or 1.0 
percent of GDP globally (1.4 percent for developing countries). We also assume that 
those gains will accrue fully after an eight-year phase-in period from 2008, prior to 
which the gains will begin in 2008 at one-eighth the full amount as of 2015 and rise 
by a further one-eighth each year until 2015. 
There are dynamic gains from trade to consider in addition to the above 
comparative static ones. The past experiences of successful reformers such as Korea, 
China, India and Chile suggest trade opening immediately boosts GDP growth rates 
by several percentage points per year for many years. A conservative estimate might 
be that reform boosts GDP growth rates – projected to 2015 by the World Bank 
(2006) to be 2.7 percent for high-income countries and 4.6 percent for developing 
countries and so 3.2 percent globally – by one-sixth or 0.45 of a percentage point for 
high-income countries and by one-third or 1.53 percentage points for developing 
countries, that is, to 3.15 and 6.13 percent, respectively, and hence from 3.2 to 3.73 
percent globally through to 2015.
18,19 For the period after 2015, we assume the boost 
to growth rates diminishes linearly over time, petering out by 2025 in the low-gain 
case and by 2050 in the high-gain case. Thereafter there would be no further dynamic 
benefit in the absence of further reforms, just the continuing comparative static gain 
of 0.2 percent globally and 0.28 percent for developing countries. This is in line with 
the summary of the literature provided by Winters (2004), who argues that while the 
growth increments due to trade liberalisation will be temporary, they could last 
several decades.  
In addition to these contribution to net global benefits, multilateral trade 
opening also can contribute to reducing inequality and poverty both between and 
within countries (Hertel and Winters 2006, Hertel et al. 2007). While those are 
benefits that cannot be incorporated in the standard benefit-cost metric used in this 
project, they can be thought of as positive externalities that reduce such things as 
inter- and intra-national social tensions, environmental degradation, malnutrition, and 
                                                 
18 For years beyond 2015, we assume the developing country real GDP growth rate converges lineally 
from 4.6 percent to the current global average of 3.2 percent p.a. over the remaining 85 years (while 
high-income countries continue to grow at 2.7 percent).  
19 Econometric support for the claim that this assumed increase in GDP growth rates is conservative is 
provided by Romalis (2007), who estimates that the elimination of just import tariffs, and only by high-
income countries, would boost annual GDP growth in developing countries by up to 1.6 percentage 
points. In the model by Rutherford and Tarr (2002), their ten percentage point cut in tariffs led to a rise 
in the steady-state growth rate of 2 percent p.a. to 2.6 percent over the first decade and 2.2 percent over 





disease, thereby addressing several of the other challenges being considered by the 
Copenhagen Consensus project.  
 
Prospective benefits of just removing intra-American trade barriers  
 
The negotiations to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) – the largest 
such FTA negotiation currently under way – have run into political problems, so it is 
not clear if/when they might conclude. The same is true of the negotiations to create 
an FTA between the European Union and the Southern American countries that are 
members of Mercosur (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/mercosur/intro/index.htm). It is nonetheless 
worth considering that type of opportunity so as to point out that the potential global 
gains from such sub-global FTAs are only a small fraction of those obtainable from 
multilateral liberalization. Two studies that examine both multilateral reform and the 
FTAA are the BKS study and a follow-on to the HRT one, by Harrison, Rutherford, 
Tarr and Gurgel (2004). BKS estimate the gains from the FTAA to be just one-
twenty-fourth that from a full multilateral trade liberalization, and for the HRTG 
study the difference is even greater. The North and Latin American economies are 
projected to gain (Table 8), although the estimated magnitudes differ considerably 
between the two FTAA studies – just as they do in Table 1, and for the same reasons. 
Note, however, that both studies suggest excluded economies in aggregate would be 
worse off if the FTAA went ahead, as is always possible with sub-global reforms 
because of trade diversion. 
Table 8 also reports broader liberalizations, so as to be able to compare their 
estimated welfare effects on the Americas and the rest of the world with those that 
might result from an FTAA. The BKS study shows how much greater would be the 
gains to the North and Latin American countries if each of them were instead just to 
adopt free trade unilaterally: North America would be five times better off, and Latin 
America 2.3 times better off. Even more striking is the effect on the rest of the world: 
instead of losing slightly as in the FTAA scenario, other regions would gain 
substantially from unilateral trade reform in the Americas. And then if the unilateral 
reform extended to the rest of the world (i.e. a move to global free trade), the 
Americas would be better off by a further 50+ percent (because of also gaining from 
other regions‘ reform), while the rest of the world would be five times better off 
(Table 8(a)). 
The HRTG study reported two other variants of broader reform. The first 
involves adding an EU-Mercosur FTA on top of the FTAA. That reduces substantially 
the welfare-reducing aspects of the FTAA for Latin America and the EU, but the rest 
of the world still loses slightly in aggregate. If instead all countries were to liberalize 
even by just halving their tariffs, the rest of the world would be far better off but Latin 
America would benefit only half as much because of greater competition/ the loss of 
preferences into the markets of North America and the EU. The final column of Table 
8(b) reports the results from the lower-bound Doha scenario described above. That 
scenario would involve considerably less liberalization than a 50 percent across the 
board global reform, especially for developing countries because of the Special and 
Differential Treatment they have demanded in the form of lesser tariff cuts under the 
Doha Round, so not surprisingly they are lower than the global 50 percent case. Note, 
though that they generate much bigger gains than the FTAA plus EU-Mercosur 
scenario for all but Latin America – and Latin America could alter that simply by 





(e.g., to match the degree of opening up involved in joining FTAs with North 
America and the EU). 
Even if several such large FTAs were to be agreed, their potential contribution 
to world economic welfare would remain only a fraction of what is potentially 
achievable via a similar degree of tariff cuts under a multilateral agreement. 
Furthermore, these FTA studies take no account of the dampening effect of the rules 
of origin that almost invariably constrain the extent to which firms can take advantage 
of any FTA‘s removal of bilateral tariffs (Krueger 1999).  
Similarly, studies of Europe‘s proposed Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) with the poor countries of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group 
almost all anticipate zero gains or actual economic loses from them, at least in static 
terms.
20 In those studies their authors felt the effects on economic growth generally 
were too difficult to model formally. One of the very few studies that does offer 
empirical estimates of the effects of FTAs on economic growth, by Vamvakidis 
(1999), finds either zero or negative effects.   
Of course there is more motivation to forming preferential FTAs than just 
economic welfare, but that is also true of multilateral agreements. Moreover, the latter 
have the virtue of being non-discriminatory, of involving much less negotiating cost 
per dollar of benefit, and of having a far higher probability of no country, nor any 
significant group of households within each participating country, losing from the 
agreement – in part because multilateral reform encourages each country to move 
resources to activities in which the country has its stongest comparative advantages, 
whereas preferential FTAs may encourage resources to move to now-more-profitable 
activities which subsequently become uncompetitive following the next FTA or WTO 
agreement. All this implies the costs of adjusting to an FTA per dollar gained is likely 
to be far lower for a WTO agreement than for an FTA. And since the probability of an 
FTAA forming looks even less promising than for concluding a DDA agreement 
during the next few years, there is no point in formally calculating a benefit/cost ratio 
for this opportunity. 
 
Removing developed country barriers to exports from least-developed countries 
 
The EU‘s initiative to extend market access preferences to least developed countries 
(LDCs) provides duty- and quota-free access to the EU for exports of ‗everything but 
arms‘ (EBA). That initiative received in-principle, best-endeavours endorsement at 
the WTO Ministerial in Doha in November 2001, but without any specific timetable. 
A similar initiative has been put forward for providing free market access for all 
African products (Collier 2007).  
Liberal though that proposal sounds, note that it does not include trade in 
services (of which the most important for LDCs would be movement of natural 
persons, that is, freedom for LDC laborers to work on temporary visas in the EU or 
other high-wage countries). Also, a number of safeguard provisions are included in 
addition to the EU‘s normal anti-dumping measures. Furthermore, access to three 
politically sensitive agricultural markets, bananas, rice and sugar, is being phased in 
by the EU only gradually over this decade – and they are subject to stricter 
safeguards.  
                                                 
20 A small selection of the literature includes: Gasiorek and Winters (2004), Milner, Morrissey and 
McKay (2005), and UNECA (2007). All find fault with specific aspects of the EPAs but none suggests 





Several empirical studies of the initiative have already appeared. A World 
Bank study by Ianchovichina, Mattoo and Olarreaga (2001) compares the EU 
proposal, from the viewpoint of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with recent initiatives of 
the United States and Japan. Its GTAP modelling results suggest that even the most 
generous interpretation of the United States‘ Africa Growth and Opportunity Act 
(which they model as unrestricted access to the US for all SSA exports) would benefit 
SSA very little because the US economy is already very open and, in the products 
where it is not (e.g. textiles and clothing), SSA countries have little comparative 
advantage
21. By contrast, the EU proposal, especially if it were to apply to all Quad 
countries (the EU, the US, Canada and Japan), would have a sizeable effect on SSA 
trade and welfare – provided agriculture is included in the deal. Just from EU access 
alone, SSA exports would be raised by more than US$0.5 billion and SSA economic 
welfare would increase by $0.3 billion per year (a 0.2 percent boost).
22 The results 
overstate the benefits of the EU proposal, however, as this World Bank study assumes 
all SSA countries (excluding relatively wealthy South Africa and Mauritius), not just 
the LDCs amongst them, would get duty- and quota-free access. 
Another World Bank study, by Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2002), uses a 
partial equilibrium approach and looks at the benefit of the EU initiative for LDCs not 
just in SSA but globally. It finds that trade of LDCs would increase by US$2.5 billion 
per year if all Quad countries provided LDCs with duty- and quota-free access on all 
merchandise.
23 However, almost half of that increase would come as a result of trade 
diversion from other developing countries. The authors suggest this is trivial because 
it represents less than 0.1 percent of other developing countries‘ exports (about $1.1 
billion), but precisely because the diversion will be in simple goods that can be 
produced in LDCs, it will mostly fall on people in other poor countries whose 
circumstances are hardly better than those in the LDCs.
24 Moreover, if the 48 LDCs 
are given such preferences, they will become advocates for rather than against the 
continuation of MFN tariff peaks for agriculture and textiles – diminishing 
considerably the number of WTO members negotiating for their reduction. It may be 
true that MFN reductions in agricultural and textile tariffs would help LDCs much 
less than it would help other developing countries, as the study by Hoekman, Ng and 
Olarreaga (2002) finds; but the gains to consumers in the QUAD would be more than 
sufficient to allow them to increase their aid to LDCs to compensate many times over 
for the loss of LDC income from the preference erosion that necessarily accompanies 
MFN reform. 
Another cause for concern is that most estimates of the effects of preferences 
do not take into account that firms are heterogeneous. When preferences and their 
accompanying rules of origin (ROOs) encourage more capital-intensive production 
(e.g., to take advantage of volumetric import quotas), they may raise investment and 
                                                 
21 A more recent ex post study of AGOA declares it to have been a success – Frazer and van 
Biesebroeck (2007). It raised Africa‘s exports by 0.15% of GDP. As the authors note, this is not 
insignificant, but, especially for an arrangement whose virtues are much proclaimed, it is a drop in the 
bucket.  
22 This is very similar to the estimate by UNCTAD/Commonwealth Secretariat (2001, Ch. 3). 
23 This and other estimates of gains from preferential market access provisions need to be discounted to 
the extent that such things as rules of origin, anti-dumping duties, and sanitary, phytosanitary and other 
technical barriers limit the actual trade allowed. For a detailed analysis of these types of restrictions on 
EU imports from Bangladesh in recent years, see UNCTAD/Commonwealth Secretariat (2001, Ch. 5). 
24 The impact outside the LDC group would be far from trivial for Mauritius, however, since the vast 
bulk of its exports are quota-restricted sales of clothing and sugar to the EU and US. See the discussion 





exports but they also bias exports away from less capital intensive activities in which 
the LDCs have a comparative advantage, and in the process lower average 
productivity of exporters. Evidence of this in Bangladesh‘s exports to the US and EU 
is provided by Demidova, Kee and Krishna (2006). That study finds the firms that 
take advantage of the less-restrictive ROOs of the EU (as compared with the US) are 
less productive than the firms that export to the US. 
These results suggest the gains from this opportunity for developing countries 
as a group – or even for just the LDCs amongst them – are meagre at best,
25 and 
possibly negative in aggregate for developing countries. And as with preferential 
FTAs, the cost associated with this opportunity are likely to be relatively high because 
it would encourage resources to move to activities which subsequently become 
uncompetitive following the next FTA or WTO agreement. Hence this opportunity 
does not warrant a formal benefit/cost calculus.  
 
Prospective benefits of freeing up international labor movements 
 
The challenge in high-income countries of a shortage of low-skilled workers has been 
eased by merchandise trade with and FDI flows to labor-abundant developing 
countries, most notably China in the past two decades. But that has been far from 
sufficient to equalize wages across countries. Historical experience in the 50 years to 
World War I showed that by far the fastest way to bring about a convergence in living 
standards is through international migration (Williamson 2002). Notwithstanding the 
liberalization of much merchandise trade post-World War II, and the opportunity 
through the WTO‘s Doha round to reduce those and services trade barriers further, the 
CGE analyses by Winters et al. (2003) suggest that this will still be the case in the 
foreseeable future. When coupled with an aging population in high-income countries, 
there is a compelling case for them to expand their quotas on immigrants from 
developing countries. Indeed Mattoo and Subramanian (2003) argue that this would 
be essential if the Doha round is to deliver on its promise of being development-
friendly.  
None of the studies listed in Table 1 consider the possibility of the services 
negotiations including provision for more temporary movement of labor (Mode IV in 
the WTO‘s General Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS). Yet if trade 
liberalization in goods and other services proves too difficult politically to achieve in 
the next few years, the benefits of formally liberalizing international labor flows as a 
possible substitute for goods trade is worth contemplating – not least because 
otherwise illegal migration is likely to increase (Hanson 2006). Current immigration 
laws are very strict, such that labor flows are much less significant across borders than 
flows of goods, other services and financial capital. Presumably this helps explain 
why the dispersion of pay for similarly skilled workers across the globe so greatly 
exceeds the dispersion of prices for goods and financial capital (Freeman 2007). This 
in turn signals an additional opportunity for reducing inequality and poverty. Freeman 
discusses some radical policy options for making such a commitment more palatable 
in receiving countries (e.g., auctioning off visas and using the revenue to compensate 
any losers among current residents), as does Pritchett (2007) in his provocative book 
Let Their People Come. Meanwhile Schiff (2007) explores which policy measure 
                                                 
25 To any such generalizations there is always the possibility of exceptions. Collier and Venables 
(2007) argue the non-reciprocal preferential access to the EU market was no less than transformational 





might be optimal among the three options of permanent, guest-worker or GATS Mode 
IV flows.
26 
An early attempt to measure the gains from freeing international migration 
was made more than two decades ago by Hamilton and Whalley (1984). Moses and 
Letnes (2004) have updated that study, and find a reduction in international migration 
controls sufficient to reduce the difference between developing country and global 
wage rates by 10 percent generates a welfare gain of the order of $774 billion per 
year, in 1998 US dollars (assuming unitary elasticities of substitution in production in 
all regions). 
More recently, the Linkage model used for the above Doha analysis has been 
used by the World Bank in a study of the potential gains from a one-off expansion 
over a 25-year period in international migration (World Bank 2006, Chapter 2). That 
study builds on earlier work by Winters et al. (2003) and draws on a new bilateral 
migration and remittances database involving no less than 226 countries (Parsons et 
al. 2007), thereby capturing the past patterns of migration between different countries 
(including the profile of accompanying family members if any). It simulates the 
impacts of an increase in migrants per year from developing to high-income countries 
that accumulates to a 3 percent boost in the latter‘s labor force (both skilled and 
unskilled) by 2025, a total of 14.2 million workers and their families coming at the 
rate of 568,000 extra migrant workers per year over the 25 years beginning in 2001. 
To put that in context, in 2000 a net total of 2.4 million people migrated from 
developing to high-income countries (UN Population Division 2002, Table 1). That 
extra 3 percent gain in the high-income countries‘ workforce by 2025 represents a 
loss of merely 0.4 percent to the developing countries‘ workforce, and even in the 
developing countries‘ skilled category it represents only a 1.7 percent loss of workers 
(final column of Table 9).  
That comparative static migration study estimates the global gains by 2025 
would amount to $674 billion per year in 2001 US dollars. Of that, $624 billion would 
be enjoyed by current citizens of developing countries. That includes those who 
migrate, whose share is estimated to be $481 billion in after-tax income (net of what 
the model assumes they remit back to their country or origin, based on past bilateral 
remittance patterns of existing migrants, the average of which is 17 percent of the 
migrant‘s earnings).
27 The small residual gain to the host country comprises a non-
trivial gain to natives ($138 billion), but a loss to earlier migrants (of $88 billion or 6 
percent) because they would face stronger competition in the workplace from the new 
migrants than would natives (even though the proportional increase in skilled migrant 
workers is much higher than in unskilled migrants to get the same 3 percent increase 
in both groups of workers in host countries). That is, their good fortune from being an 
earlier migrant would be shared somewhat with the newest migrants as the stock of 
migrants grows (see Table 10). 
That comparative static aggregate global gain of $674 billion per year 
represents just over 1 percent of the projected global income for 2025. We assume the 
annual migration numbers return to normal after 2025, and that the on-going 
comparative static gain for the rest of this century from this accelerated program 
remains at just over 1 percent of global GDP. It is difficult to say how those gains 
                                                 
26 See also the contribution on migration to the first Copenhagen Consensus project, by Martin (2004). 
27 Remittances since 1995 have become more important than official development assistance flows to 
developing countries and were equal to inflows of foreign direct investment in 2003. They have risen 
as a share of developing country GDP from 0.1 percent in 1970 to 0.9 percent by 1990, 1.4 percent by 





would be shared between groups over a whole century (four generations), but if they 
were shared in the same proportions between migrants and natives as in 2025 (see 
final column of Table 10) then most would go to current citizens of developing 
countries, particularly the migrants themselves. To err on the conservative side, we 
also assume there are no additional dynamic gains from migration, even though they 
may well be a similar order of magnitude to those from product trade reform. 
That proportional comparative static global gain in 2025 is more than five 
times the proportional gain reported above for the ‗Central‘ Scenario of the Doha 
Round as of 2015 (both expressed in 2001 US dollars). Or to put it another way, if the 
extent of increased migration was only one-fifth as large (a 0.5 instead of 3.0 percent 
increase in the recipient countries‘ labor force by 2025) it could generate the same 
proportional comparative static global gain as the Doha Round might achieve via 
goods trade liberalization – but with more of the gain going to current citizens of 
developing countries.  
The migration opportunity is of course not necessarily an alternative to the 
Doha opportunity. Indeed if Doha were to also embrace (as part of a GATS Mode IV 
agreement) the migration scenario described above, the resulting greater international 
economic integration would boost the gains from Doha enormously. The additional 
gains from Doha may not be exactly the sum of the two scenarios, as the net effect 
would depend on the degree to which product trade is a substitute for this form of 
‗trade‘ in labor services. But given the smallness of the proportional changes in the 
aggregate size and skill composition of the workforce involved in that extra migration 
shown in Table 9, and the expected complementarity between trade in products and 





Quantifying Economic Costs of Reducing Trade and Migration 
Barriers 
 
The above benefits from reform are not costless of course. And the costs associated 
with trade reform differ from those associated with migration, so they are considered 
in turn. 
 
Costs associated with Doha trade reform 
 
Expenditure on trade negotiating, and on supporting policy think tanks and the like to 
develop and disseminate a convincing case for trade reform, could be expanded many 
fold before running into declining returns. But even with a substantial expansion in 
those activities, the overall cost would be trivial compared with the global gains from 
trade reform (a fraction of 1 percent of the benefits).  
Of much more significance are the private costs of adjustment for firms and 
workers as reform forces some industries to downsize or close to allow others to 
expand (Matusz and Tarr 2000; Francois 2003). Those costs are ignored in the global 
                                                 
28 In a recent econometric study of migration to OECD countries, Dolman (2008) finds that countries 
tend to trade and invest more with countries from which they have received more migrants, especially 
if there are large language and other characteristics that distance those countries – and those greater 





CGE models discussed above, where the aggregate employment rate is held constant 
in each economy.
29 
There are also social costs to consider. They include social safety net 
provisions in so far as such schemes are developed/drawn on by losers from reform 
(e.g., unemployment payments plus training grants to build up new skills so displaced 
workers can earn the same wage as before).  
All three types are one-off costs to weigh against the non-stop flow of 
economic benefits from reform. The private and social costs of adjustment tend to be 
smaller, the longer the phase-in period or smaller the tariff or subsidy cut per year 
(Furusawa and Lai 1999). Also, CGE simulation studies suggest that the annual 
change in an industry‘s terms of trade due to phased trade reform is typically very 
minor relative to changes due to exchange rate fluctuations, technological 
improvements, preference shifts and other economic shocks and structural 
developments associated with normal economic growth (Anderson et al. 1997). 
Estimates of the magnitude of those costs are difficult to generate, but all 
available estimates suggest they are minor relative to the benefits from reform. An 
early study by Magee (1972) for the United States estimated the cost of job changes 
including temporary unemployment to be one-eighth of the benefits from tariff and 
quota elimination initially. Even assuming that transition took as many as five years, 
he estimated a benefit/cost ratio of 25. A subsequent study which examined a 50 
percent cut in US tariffs (but not quotas) came up with a similar benefit/cost estimate 
(Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson 1980). In more recent debates about trade and labor, 
analysts have had difficulty finding a strong link between import expansion and 
increased unemployment (see Greenaway and Nelson 2002). One example is a study 
of the four largest EU economies‘ imports from East Asia (Bentivogli and Pagano 
1999). Another European example is a study of the UK footwear industry: liberalizing 
that market would incur unemployment costs only in the first year, because of the 
high job turnover in that industry, and those estimated costs are less than 1.5 percent 
of the benefits from cutting that protection (Winters and Takacs 1991). A similar-
sized estimate is provided by de Melo and Tarr (1990) using a CGE model that 
focuses just on US textile, steel and auto protection cuts and drawing on estimates of 
the cost of earnings lost by displaced workers (later reported by Jacobson, LaLonde 
and Sullivan 1993).  
For developing countries also the evidence seems to suggest low costs of 
adjustment, not least because trade reform typically causes a growth spurt (Krueger 
1983). In a study of 13 liberalization efforts for nine developing countries, Michaely, 
Papageorgiou and Choksi (1991) found only one example where employment was not 
higher within a year. A similar study for Mauritius by Milner and Wright (1998) also 
found trade opening to be associated with employment growth rather than decline.
30 A 
                                                 
29 Incorporating adjustment activities, such as worker retraining, appear to be of small, second-order 
importance in CGE modelling if the government is able to make credible policy commitments (Karp 
and Paul 2005) – which it is in the case of multilateral reform agreements under the WTO. 
30 A further impact of trade policy reform about which concern is often expressed is the loss of tariff 
revenue for the government. This is of trivial importance to developed and upper middle-income 
countries where trade taxes account for only 1 and 3 percent of government revenue, respectively. For 
lower middle-income countries that share is 9 percent, and it is more than 20 percent for more than a 
dozen low-income countries for which data are available, so how concerned should those poorer 
countries be? The answer depends on whether/how much that revenue would fall and, if it does fall, on 
whether/how much more costly would be the next best alternative means of raising government 
revenue. On the first of those two points, government revenue from import taxes will rise rather than 





survey of 18 Latin American countries for the period 1970 to 1996, by Marquez and 
Pages (1998), found some increases in short-term unemployment, but mainly in 
countries where the real exchange rate appreciated as a result of capital inflows that 
had accompanied the reforms. That small short-term negative effect soon reversed as 
production became more labour intensive following reform, according to studies by 
Moreira and Najberg (2000) for Brazil and de Ferranti et al. (2001) for a wide range 
of Latin American and Caribbean countries over the 1990s.  
If the adjustment costs are so small and may lead to more rather than less jobs 
even during the adjustment period, why are governments so reluctant to open their 
economies? The reason is because the anticipated losses in jobs and asset values are 
very obvious and concentrated whereas the gains in terms of new job and investment 
opportunities are thinly spread, are less-easily attributed to the trade reform, and are 
taken up often by people other than those losing from the reform.
31 Moreover, there is 
considerable uncertainty as to who in fact will end up bearing the costs or reaping net 
benefits, leading all groups to be less enthusiastic about reform (Fernadez and Rodrik 
1991). As discussed above, the few losers are prepared to support politicians who 
resist protection cuts, while the gains are sufficiently small per consumer and 
unassisted firm as to make it not worthwhile for those many potential gainers to get 
together to lobby for reform, particularly given their greater free-rider problem in 
acting collectively (Olsen 1965). Thus reform has political, and possibly employment, 
costs for politicians and one should not under-estimate the difficulties of political 
action to reduce/eliminate trade protection measures. We do not factor these into the 
economic cost/benefit analysis for society as a whole, however, because they are not 
of a comparable form and the purpose of the Copenhagen Consensus process is to 
contribute to their erosion. Nor do we count the transfers among people within each 
country as part of the gross benefits and costs of reform, since they are clearly 
transfers rather than net costs or benefits to each national society. Rather, we 
implicitly assume society costlessly compensates the losers using the extra tax 
revenue from those whose incomes rise.  
A prime example of the role analysis can play has to do with effects on 
developing countries in reforms to support for agriculture in OECD economies. The 
primary channel for such effects is through the terms of trade, which in turn depend in 
part on whether a country is a net exporter or importer of the affected OECD 
                                                                                                                                            
bans, or tariffs that are prohibitive (or nearly so) or which encourage smuggling or under-invoicing or 
corruption by customs officials. It is possible even in a tariff-only regime that lower tariffs lead to a 
sufficiently higher volume and value of trade that the aggregate tariff collection rises. Examples of 
recent trade policy reforms that led to increased tariff revenue are Chile and Mexico (Bacchetta and 
Jansen 2003, p. 15) and Kenya (Glenday 2002). See also Greenaway and Milner (1993) and Nash and 
Takacs (1998). Since the economy is enlarged by opening up, income and consumption tax collections 
will automatically rise too. On the second point, about the cost of raising government revenue by other 
means if tax revenue does fall, Corden (1997, Ch. 4) makes it clear that in all but the poorest of 
countries it will be more rather than less efficient to collect tax revenue in other ways. Even countries 
as poor as Cambodia have managed to introduce a value added tax. Hence from a global viewpoint 
there is no significant cost that needs to be included in response to this concern. To the extent subsidies 
are also cut as part of the reform, the chances of government revenue rising are even greater. Income 
and consumption tax revenue also will rise as the economy expands following reform. In any case CGE 
modellers typically alter those other tax rates when trade tax revenues change so as to keep the overall 
government budget unchanged. 
31 In the Australian context of high unemployment in the latter 1970s, Max Corden was prompted to 
write a deliberately non-technical paper called ‗Tell us where the new jobs will come from?‘ because 
he knew the answer was not obvious to non-economists (Corden 1979). The paper proved so popular 





products. Long-term support for agriculture in OECD countries, coupled with often-
negative assistance to farmers in many developing countries, has left developing 
countries as a group dependent on imports of these subsidized products. As a result, 
an across-the-board cut in all domestic support for OECD agriculture leads to welfare 
losses for many developing countries and to declines in farm incomes in Europe, 
Japan and North America. Such a reform package is therefore unlikely to be 
implemented on its own. An alternative approach is to focus on broad-based 
reductions in market price support, as has begun occurring in the EU where domestic 
support has increasingly replaced border measures. As Dimaranan, Hertel and Keeney 
(2004) show, a shift from market price support to land-based payments could generate 
a win-win-win outcome whereby OECD farm incomes are maintained and yet world 
price distortions are reduced and economic welfare rises for most developing 
countries and globally. Provided these increased domestic support payments are not 
linked to output or variable inputs, the trade-distorting and welfare-reducing effects 
are likely to be small, thereby providing an effective way of offsetting the potential 
losses that would otherwise be sustained by OECD farmers. This type of policy re-
instrumentation increases the probability that such reforms are politically acceptable 
in the reforming economies while simultaneously increasing the likelihood that they 
will be beneficial to developing countries.  
The existing estimates of the adjustment costs to trade reform are very small, 
but they are concentrated on particular individuals and so perhaps deserve large 
weight socially. It is certainly possible that those estimates omit some elements too, 
such as the disutility of one-off uncertainty and disruption experienced by everyone in 
adjusting to policy changes.
32 Hence, so as not to exaggerate the net gains from a 
Doha trade reform, it is assumed here that there would be an adjustment period of 
eight years following the beginning of liberalization (assumed to be 2008), and that in 
each of those years the adjustment costs would be 15 percent of the annual 
comparative static benefits as of 2015 (and zero thereafter) in the high case, and 5 
percent in the lower-bound case when much less adjustment would be needed. For the 
high case that amounts to $71 billion per year during 2008 to 2015 globally, of which 
$24 billion is expended in developing countries, when expressed in 2005 US dollars 
by using the projection to 2015 of global GDP provided by the World Bank (2006). 
For the lower-bound case the costs would be one-third of those values. 
 
Costs associated with increased international migration 
 
The migration opportunity also would involve costs. There are the direct one-off costs 
to migrants of obtaining visas and work permits, transport and transitional expenses, 
costs of searching for housing, schooling, employment, etc. upon arrival, as well as 
the emotional cost of separating from extended family and in some cases temporarily 
breaking up the nuclear family. There are also one-off costs to the host-country 
government of processing applications and providing initial help with housing, 
welfare payments and the like. 
  In terms of adjustment costs in the workplace, in so far as migrants are 
attracted or recruited to positions for which there is excess demand, they will be 
reducing underemployment of capital in those industries. Since that is a significant 
                                                 
32 We should be explicit that we cannot take the distributional dimensions into account more formally 
in this aggregate analysis, but they obviously matter in the real world. A detailed discussion of the 
effects of trade liberalisation on poverty is given by Winters (2002) and Winters, McCulloch and 





part of the motivation for host countries seeking migrants, especially as their native 
population is aging rapidly, this may well offset the other costs associated with 
migration – especially if the skill mix and timing of immigration flows are designed to 
alleviate such labor shortages. However, to err on the conservative side for the 
purpose of calculating benefit/cost ratios, it is assumed here there are net costs 
involved for both the migrants and the host governments‘ taxpayers.  
Fees charged by private recruitment agencies offer evidence of part of the 
direct cost of migration to migrants. The World Bank (2006, Table 3.1) cites several 
studies within the range $700 to $1,700, but one for Thai emigrants to Japan of more 
than $8,000. Such studies may overstate the true cost of the services actually offered, 
however, insofar as the agency is able to capture also some of the lifetime benefits 
expected by the migrant (Abella 2004).  
For present purposes, in the absence of reliable estimates of overall costs it is 
necessary to rely on using a range of guesses. Our low guesstimate is that each 
migrant worker (and his family) spends on average $7,000 in 2001 US dollars to 
migrate in the year of migration. To err on the conservative side and allow for 
significant social costs associated with increased immigration and emigration we have 
chosen, for the high-cost case, combined costs of three times the low-cost ones, or 
$21,000 per worker and family in the year of migration. The same-sized average costs 
are assumed also to be borne by the host country government (a low of $7,000 and a 
high of $21,000 in the year of migration). These are generous cost estimates, to allow 
for the fact that some migrants may draw social welfare benefits beyond their first 
year. But we assume that after the first year migrants subsequently become fiscally 
neutral on average in the sense that the cost of public services they receive after 
settling is just equal to the income tax they pay. 
 
 
Net Benefits and Benefit/Cost Analysis 
 
With these numbers fed into a spreadsheet, it is possible to graph the flow of annual 
net benefits from the various scenarios. A sample of these from 2008 through to 2100 
are presented in Figures 1 and 2 in terms of annual increments to GDP (not the 
difference in levels). In each case we refer to the ‗high net gains‘ scenarios. Figure 1 
shows the Doha scenario and the scenario with extra migration, as well as the 
undiscounted base projection of GDP increments each year in the world and in 
developing countries (the dark lines). Were the Doha partial reforms to be phased in 
over an eight-year period beginning in 2008, our ‗central‘ scenario including dynamic 
gains projects those GDP increments in the world and in developing countries to 
follow the higher dashed lines in Figure 1. Given the higher GDP growth rate 
assumed for developing than developed countries over this century, it is not surprising 
that by 2100 those countries would be enjoying an even larger share of those global 
gains from trade reform than in the earlier years – although many of them would by 
then have joined the ‗high-income country‘ club. The net benefits in Figure 1 are not 
discounted back to present-value terms. To see the impact that discounting has, Figure 
2 reports the net present value data using the higher (6 percent) discount factor. 
  Three key points are worth stressing about the depicted numerical simulation 
results. First, from a global viewpoint the gains from extra migration exceed those 
from trade reform in the early years, but over the long term the comparative static 
gains from a Doha trade reform are similar in magnitude to those from the extra 





  Second, the dynamic gains from trade reform can be seen clearly from Figure 
2 to be many times greater than the comparative static gains. There may well be 
dynamic gains from extra migration too, although to err on the conservative side we 
have not included them in this simulation exercise.  
Third, from the viewpoint of current citizens of just developing countries 
(including its extra-emigrants-to-be), they would reap the vast majority of the global 
gains from extra migration and those gains to them would far exceed at least the 
comparative static gains to them from a Doha trade reform that excluded greater 
temporary migration of labour. That suggests an extra flow of migrants to today‘s 
high-income countries probably would have a stronger egalitarian, pro-poor 
distributional outcome in favour of current developing country citizens then just 
allowing more products to be traded.  
The range of present-value benefits and costs for the low- and high-gain cases, 
using both 3 and 6 percent as the discount rate to bring the net benefit flows back to 
the present (2008), are summarized in Table 11. In all cases the benefits are estimated 
through to the year 2100, and they and the up-front costs continue to be expressed in 
2001 US dollars. 
In the Doha trade reform scenarios, the ‗low gains‘ case refers to global 
comparative static gains of just 0.2 percent of GDP while the ‗high gains‘ case refers 
global gains five times that lower benefit. In present value terms the net benefit of a 
‗central‘ Doha outcome ranges from $42 trillion to $113 trillion at the higher discount 
rate and about four times that at the lower discount rate. The costs range from $50 
billion to $450 billion in present value terms, but they are mostly private rather than 
government costs and are dwarfed by the gross benefits. Today‘s developing countries 
reap the majority of those net gains, as their share of the global economy is assumed 
to grow throughout this century (although at a progressively slower rate after 2015). 
Their benefit/cost ratios from the trade reform opportunity offered by the Doha round 
are between 690 and 900 in the higher discount rate case and between 2700 and 3100 
in the lower discount rate case. This is clearly an extremely high payoff activity, if 
only the political will to bring about a successful conclusion to the Doha round can be 
found. 
  If for political reasons the Doha round cannot be brought to a successful 
conclusion, high-income country governments still have the opportunity to boost their 
intakes of migrant workers from developing countries. In the migration scenarios, the 
low-cost (‗high net gains‘) case refers to one-off costs of just $14,000 per worker and 
family (shared equally by the migrants and the host government). For the high-cost 
(‗low net gains‘) case, combined costs of three times the low-cost ones are assumed, 
or $42,000 per worker and family in the year of migration. In present value terms the 
global net benefit of that increased flow of migrants for 25 years is shown in Table 11 
to be $13 trillion at the higher discount rate and $38 trillion at the lower discount rate. 
Since costs are so small compared with benefits, the benefit/cost ratios for developing 
country citizens are again very high, ranging between 100 and 840. This too is 
without doubt a very high payoff, and one that does not even require multilateral 
agreement – it simply requires greater benevolence on the part of developed country 
citizens and their national governments. 
 
 







Because trade reform generates large and on-going economic gains while incurring 
comparatively minor one-off adjustment costs, it would allow individuals and 
governments the freedom to spend more on other pressing problems, thereby 
indirectly contributing to the alleviation of other challenges facing society.
33 But in 
addition, trade reform would also directly alleviate some of those challenges. This 
section first focuses on the impact of trade reform on poverty alleviation, since that is 
the solution to many of the world‘s problems. It then turns to trade reform‘s impact on 
the environment, before briefly commenting on its impact on several of the other 
specific challenges being addressed in this project, namely, communicable diseases, 
conflicts, under-investment in education, corruption, and malnutrition and hunger. 




Evidence presented by Dollar and Kraay (2002), Sala-i-Martin (2006) and others, and 
carefully surveyed in Ravallion (2006), suggests aggregate economic growth 
differences have been largely responsible for the differences in poverty alleviation 
across regions. Initiatives that boost economic growth are therefore likely to be 
helpful in the fight against poverty, and trade liberalization is such an initiative. But 
cuts to subsidies and trade barriers also alter relative product prices domestically and 
in international markets, which in turn affect factor prices. Hence the net effect on 
poverty depends also on the way those price changes affect poor households‘ 
expenditure and their earnings net of remittances. If the consumer and producer price 
changes (whether due to own-country reforms and/or those of other countries) are 
pro-poor, then they will tend to reinforce any positive growth effects of trade reform 
on the poor. 
The effects of trade reform on global poverty can be thought of at two levels: 
on the income gap between developed and developing countries, and on poor 
households within developing countries. On the first, the CGE estimates surveyed 
above suggest that current developing countries, which produce just one-fifth of 
global GDP, would enjoy nearly half of the net present value of the global static plus 
dynamic gains from reducing trade barriers. Clearly that will lower substantially the 
income gap between developed and poorer countries on average.  
How poor households within developing countries are affected is more 
difficult to say (Winters 2002; Winters, McCulloch and McKay 2004). What is clear 
from Table 4 is that the agricultural policies of developed countries provide a major 
source of developing country gains from reform, and lowering barriers to textiles and 
clothing trade also is important. Both would boost the demand for unskilled labor and 
for farm products produced in poor countries. Since two-thirds of the world‘s poor 
live in rural areas and, in least-developed countries, the proportion is as high as 90 
percent (OECD 2003a, p. 3), and since most poor rural households are net sellers of 
farm labor and/or food, one would expect such reforms to reduce the number in 
absolute poverty. A set of analyses reported in Hertel and Winters (2006), in which 
GTAP and national CGE model results are carefully combined with household 
income and expenditure survey data for more than a dozen developing countries, tests 
this hypothesis and finds strong support for it in most of the country case studies 
considered.  
                                                 
33 On the intrinsic benefits of freedom of opportunity and action that freer markets provide people, 





The evidence on international migration‘s impact on global poverty is 
overwhelmingly positive. That is not to say that every small developing country will 
have less poverty if migration is freed up, because it will depend on the skill mix of 
the migrants and the extent of remittances they send back, among other things; but in 




The effects of trade reform on the environment have been the focus of much 
theoretical and empirical analysis since the 1970s and especially in the past dozen or 
so years (Copland and Taylor 2003; Beghin et al. 2002). Until recently 
environmentalists have tended to focus mainly on the direct environmental costs they 
perceive from trade reform, just as they have with other areas of economic change.
34 
That approach does not acknowledge areas where the environment might have been 
improved, albeit indirectly, as a result of trade reform (e.g., from less production by 
pollutive industries that were previously protected). Nor does it weigh the costs of any 
net worsening of the environment against the economic benefits of policy reform of 
the sort described above.  
The reality is that while the environmental effects of reform will differ across 
sectors and regions of the world, some positive and some negative, there are many 
examples where cuts to subsidies and trade barriers would reduce environmental 
damage (Anderson 1992; Irwin 2002, pp. 48-54). For some time the OECD has been 
encouraging analysis of these opportunities (OECD 1996, 1997, 1998, 2003b). 
Environmental NGOs are increasingly recognising them too. They and the better-
informed development NGOs seem to be coming to the view that the net social and 
environmental benefits from reducing subsidies and at least some trade barriers may 
indeed be positive rather than negative, and that the best hope of reducing 
environmentally harmful subsidies and trade barriers is via the WTO‘s multi-issue, 
multilateral trade negotiations process (see, e.g., Cameron 2007). 
If there remains a concern that the net effect of trade reform on the 
environment may be negative nationally or globally, that should be a stimulus to 
check whether first-best environmental policy measures are in place and set at the 
optimal level of intervention, rather than a reason for not reducing trade distortions. 
This is because if they are so set, we would then know that the direct economic gains 
from opening to trade would exceed society‘s evaluation of any extra environmental 
damage, other things equal (Corden 1997, Ch. 13).  
Much environmental damage in developing countries is a direct consequence 
of poverty (e.g., the slash-and-burn shifting agriculture of landless unemployed 
squatters). In so far as trade reform reduces poverty, so it will reduce such damage. 
More generally, the relationships between per capita income and a wide range of 
environmental indicators have been studied extensively. Because richer people have a 
greater demand for a clean environment, income rises tend to be associated with better 
environmental outcomes once incomes rise above certain levels.
35 Even though more 
pollutive products are being consumed as incomes rise, many abatement practices 
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35 This is the theme of the recent book by Hollander (2003). For statistical evidence of the extent to 
which different environmental indicators first worsen and then improve as incomes rise (sometimes 
called the environmental Kuznets curve), see the special issue of the journal Environment and 
Development Economics, Volume 2, Issue 4 in 1997 and the more-recent papers by and cited in 





have been spreading fast enough to more than compensate. And openness to trade 
accelerates that spread of abatement ideas and technologies, making their 
implementation in developing countries affordable at ever-earlier stages of 
development. 
Estimating the global cost to society of all environmental damage that might 
accompany a reduction in subsidies and trade barriers, net of all environmental gains, 
is extraordinarily difficult both conceptually and empirically.
36 In the absence of any 
sufficiently comprehensive estimates it will be assumed that the net effect of reform 
on the environment would be zero. 
When the environmental impact is global rather than local, as with greenhouse 
gases and their apparent impact on climate change, international environmental 
agreements may be required (see Cline 2004b). When developing countries are not 
party to such agreements, however, it is difficult to prevent ‗leakage‘ through a re-
location of carbon-intensive activities to those non-signatories. An alternative or 
supplementary approach that is likely to achieve at least some emission reductions, 
and at the same time generate national and global economic benefits rather than costs, 
involves lowering coal subsidies and trade barriers. Past coal policies have 
encouraged excessive production of coal in a number of industrial countries and 
excessive coal consumption in numerous developing countries including transition 
economies. Phasing out those distortionary policies has both improved the economy 
and lowered greenhouse gas emissions globally – a ‗no regrets‘ outcome or win-win 
Pareto improvement for the economy and the environment (Anderson and McKibbin 
2000). Additional opportunities for reducing greenhouse gases through cutting energy 
subsidies are pointed to in the UNEP study by von Moltke, McKee and Morgan 
(2004). 
 
Communicable diseases  
Communicable diseases are more common among the poor, so again trade reform‘s 
contribution to poverty alleviation will in turn impact on human health in general and 
the reduced incidence of diseases in particular. Furthermore, the greater openness of 
economies ensures medicines and prevention technologies are more widespread and 
cheaper, particularly following the Doha WTO conference of trade ministers and the 
subsequent Decision of 30 August 2003 on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. 
That Decision by the WTO General Council ensures developing country governments 
can issue compulsory licenses to allow other companies to make a patented product or 
use a patented process under licence without the consent of the patent owner, while 
developing countries unable to produce pharmaceuticals domestically can now import 
generic copies of patented drugs made under compulsory licensing by other 
developing countries.  
Conflicts  
 
                                                 
36 A beginning nonetheless is being made, with several governments funding ex ante evaluations of the 
WTO Doha round‘s potential impact on the environment. The EU‘s efforts include a workshop on 
methodological issues which are laid out in CEPII (2003), and further work has been contracted to the 
University of Manchester whose progress can be traced at http://idpm.man.ac.uk/sia-
trade/Consultation.htm. Ex post analyses are also being undertaken by NGOs. See, for example, 





Openness tends to break down the common prejudices that accompany insularity, and 
to broaden mutual understanding between people with different cultures and customs. 
It also expands economic interdependence among countries, which raises the 
opportunity cost of entering into conflicts with trading partners. In so far as it reduces 
income inequality across countries, then that too may diffuse tension between nations 
– a point that has even greater significance following the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001. Indeed there is now statistical support for Immanuel Kant‘s 
hypothesis that durable peace is supported by representative democracy, trade, and 
membership of international organizations: Oneal and Russett (2000) find that all 
three contribute independently to more peaceful relationships with other countries.
37 
And casual observation suggests that more-autarchic economies tend to be less 
democratic. 
  Where openness involves also greater international migration, there tends to 
be less inter-cultural conflict and more social gains from multiculturalism. 
Conversely, it is in societies that resent immigrants and impose strict migration quotas 
where cultural clashes seem to be more common. Clashes between ethnic groups are 
also more common where a minority prospers greatly relative to the majority or other 
significant minorities (Chua 2003). Such income and wealth inequality within a 
country tends to be less common the more open is the economy, at least after the 
initial adjustments to reform (Williamson 2002). 
  While many of these types of empirical studies struggle to clarify the direction 
of causation, and so their results need to be treated with caution, the weight of 
evidence nonetheless lends support to the view that greater openness can contribute to 
lessening conflict.  
 
Education under-investment  
 
Parents and governments are less likely to under-invest in education the higher their 
incomes, other things equal. So to the extent that trade reform raises incomes, it 
contributes to better educational outcomes. That is especially so for the very poorest 
who cannot afford even primary education: a slight increase in the cash income of 
poor farm families, for example following a reform-induced increase in international 
prices of farm products, can make it possible to pay the (often relatively high) school 
fees that are otherwise unaffordable. 
  If immigration restrictions are eased, the private incentive to invest in 
education in developing countries would increase even more. This offsets – at least 
partially but possibly more than fully – the brain drain concern often raised about 
emigration. It also would help to offset any reduction in the skill premium in wages in 
developing countries that may follow from liberalization of trade in goods. 
 
Poor governance and corruption  
 
A tolerance for subsidies and trade barriers breeds rent-seeking by special interests 
seeking protectionist policies for their industry. If those policies include import 
licensing, that breeds corruption through encouraging bureaucrats responsible for 
allocating licences to accept bribes from would-be importers. Together those activities 
ensure that the welfare costs of trade barriers are higher than is typically measured, 
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since a share of the private rents they generate is wasted in these lobbying activities. 
Tax-avoiding corruption is also encouraged in the case of import tariffs, for example 
through bribing customs officers or through smuggling. For these reasons it is not 
surprising that statistical analysis has found less-open economies to be more corrupt 
(Ades and Di Tella 1999).  
 
Malnutrition and hunger 
 
Food security is always a great concern in poor countries, especially those 
dependent on food imports where there are fears that reducing agricultural subsidies 
and protectionism globally will raise the price of those imports. But food security is 
defined as always having access to the minimum supply of basic food necessary for 
survival, so enhancing food security is mainly about alleviating poverty. That 
suggests this issue needs to be considered from a household rather than national 
perspective. And the discussion above argues that poverty is more likely than not to 
be alleviated by cuts to trade and immigration barriers. 
Hunger and under-nutrition can be eased by trade not only in goods but also in 
agricultural technologies, in particular newly bred varieties of staple crops. The 
introduction of high-yielding dwarf wheat and rice varieties during the Green 
Revolution that began in Asia in the 1960s is a previous case in point, whereby 
producers and consumers shared the benefits in terms of higher farm profits and lower 
consumer prices for cereals. A prospective case in point is the possibility of breeding 
crop varieties that are not only less-costly to grow but are ‗nutriceuticals‘ in the sense 
they contain vitamin and mineral supplements. The most promising is so-called 
‗golden rice‘. Consumers in many of poor countries suffer from chronic vitamin A 
deficiency that can lead to blindness, weakened immune systems, and increased 
morbidity and mortality for children and pregnant and lactating women. Golden rice 
has been genetically engineered to contain a higher level of beta-carotene in the 
endosperm of the grain and thereby provide a vitamin A supplement. By being 
cheaper and/or more nutritionally beneficial, it would improve the health of poor 
people and thereby also boost their labor productivity. Anderson, Jackson and Nielsen 
(2005) estimate that the latter economic benefit from this new technology could be as 
much as ten times greater than just the traditional benefits of lower production costs – 
not to mention that poor people would live longer and healthier lives. This new 
technology has yet to be adopted, however, because the European Union and some 
other countries will not import food from countries that may contain genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) – even though there is no evidence that GM foods are a 
danger to human health (see, e.g., King 2003). The cost of that trade barrier to 
developing countries – which is not included in the estimates in Table 1 – has been 
very considerable (Anderson and Jackson 2005). 
 
Social aspects of migration 
 
Notwithstanding the economic gains that could result from more international 
migration, and the desire by millions more people in developing countries to migrate 
(as witnessed by the huge queues of applicants in embassies, the rise in illegal 
immigration, the increase in asylum seekers, and the high fees paid by recruiters and 
people smugglers), governments of rich countries are reluctant to open up greatly. 
Migration has much broader implications for society than opening up to trade in 





sending and receiving countries, others are perceived as negative. The implications of 
increased diversity in the destination countries are especially complex and virtually 
impossibly to include adequately in an economic benefit/cost calculus. Cooperation 
between the two sets of countries can ease some of the concerns though, especially if 
they result in agreements that provide for temporary migration and the enforcement of 





Measuring both the benefits and the costs of liberalizing subsidies and barriers to 
trade and migration is still an inexact science, despite the huge amount of progress 
that has been made over the past two decades in global CGE modelling.
38 We have 
tried to accommodate shortcomings by providing a range of estimates and by erring 
on the conservative side in the above analysis. Nonetheless it is worth reviewing the 
key areas where analytical improvements are still needed. On the cost side, more 
empirical research on the real costs of adjustments to trade policy changes and of 
international migration, and how they are spread over time for different groups, would 
be helpful. On the benefit side, economists have made more progress but plenty of 
scope remains for further improvements, particularly on the size and longevity of 
dynamic gains from trade reform. Key areas, discussed in turn below, are the assumed 
policy counterfactual, the tariff aggregation issue, product quality differences, new 
products, measurement of distortions in markets for service products, and behaviour 
of labor markets particularly in response to changes in restrictive immigration 
policies. 
 
The protection counterfactual 
 
The standard approach used in evaluating the consequences of international trade 
agreements is to compare the agreed tariff binding with the previously applied tariff 
rate, and to treat the post-agreement tariff rate as the lesser of the two rates. This 
essentially involves treating the current applied rate as a deterministic forecast of 
future protection rates in the absence of the agreement. 
There are two potentially serious problems with this specification of the 
counterfactual. One is that the trend rate of protection responds systematically to 
underlying determinants that evolve over time. The second is that annual protection 
rates fluctuate substantially around that trend. Taking account of either or both of 
these counterfactuals can have large impacts on the estimated benefits of international 
trade liberalization agreements. 
Anderson and Hayami (1986) and Lindert (1991) provide insights into the 
likely evolution of agricultural trade policies in the absence of international 
agreements. Key findings include a strong tendency for agricultural protection to rise 
with economic development because of fundamental changes in the structure of the 
economy. In particular, there is a tendency for agricultural protection to be low or 
negative in very poor countries because the number of farmers is large and it is 
difficult for them to organize to apply pressure on governments. Because farmers are 
mainly subsisting at that stage, their real incomes are not greatly affected by increases 
                                                 





in farm output prices. By contrast, the urban population in a poor country is far 
smaller and easier to organize, and food is an important part of consumer budgets. 
As economies develop, however, all of these economic factors change in ways 
that shift the political-economy balance more towards agricultural protection. Farmers 
become fewer in number and find it easier to organize themselves. They also become 
more commercial in orientation, so that their real incomes are more strongly 
influenced by agricultural output prices. At the same time, the urban population 
becomes larger and hence harder to organize, and the importance of food in consumer 
budgets and hence in real wage determinations declines. The end result can be a very 
rapid increase in agricultural protection rates in high-growth economies. Without the 
new discipline of the Uruguay Round‘s Agreement on Agriculture, agricultural 
protection rates in Europe and Northeast Asia may well have kept rising over the past 
15 years, and may continue to rise in fast-growing middle-income countries whose 
tariff and subsidy bindings in WTO are still well above applied rates (Anderson 
2006).  
Also striking is the large variation in national rates of agricultural protection 
over time. This is because trade and subsidy policies are frequently used also to 
stabilize domestic agricultural prices in the face of variations in world prices
 (Tyers 
and Anderson 1992). The value of legal bindings on those policies via trade 
agreements, even when the bindings are well above applied rates at the time of the 
agreement, is non-trivial and yet is not captured in most models because those models 
are not stochastic. As Francois and Martin (2004) show, even bindings that are set 
well above average rates of protection may greatly diminish the costs of protection 
when international prices peak. They estimate, for example, that the European tariff 
binding on wheat, at 82 percent, reduced the cost of protection to this commodity by 
almost a third, despite being substantially above the average rate of protection 
prevailing during the preceding 15 years for which data were available. This suggests 
our current CGE models are understating the gains from tariff and subsidy bindings, 
particularly for farm products.   
 
Aggregation of protection 
 
Trade barriers vary enormously across commodities, and frequently also across 
suppliers thanks to regional and other preferential trade agreements. This variation in 
rates of protection increases the cost of any given ‗average‘ level of protection, since 
the cost of protection increases with the square of the rate of protection. Necessarily, 
some degree of aggregation is unavoidable in modelling the real world because the 
available information on the structure of production and consumption is at a higher 
level of aggregation than information on tariffs and trade. Further aggregation is 
employed for computational reasons in a world of more than 225 countries, thousands 
of product tariff lines, many different occupations and skill levels in labor markets, 
etc. And additional problems are introduced by the typical approach to aggregation of 
trade barriers, namely, using averages weighted by external trade: as protection rates 
rise, the weights associated with these measures decline, which means that a tariff that 
completely blocks trade has the same measured impact as a zero tariff. 
The modern approach to tariff aggregation provides a possible means of 
dealing with the aggregation problem. Anderson and Neary (1992) have developed a 
single tariff aggregator that captures the welfare impacts of a non-uniform tariff. 
Building on this approach, Bach and Martin (2001) use a tariff aggregator to capture 





given level of utility, and another to capture the impact on tariff revenues. Manole and 
Martin (2005) provide closed-form measures of these aggregators for the widely-used 
constant-elasticity-of-substitution functional form. Applying these procedures to a 
sample of seven developing countries, they find that appropriate aggregation increases 
the estimated cost of protection on average twenty-fold relative to the cost estimated 
using a weighted average tariff.  
The problems of aggregation are particularly intense in agriculture because of 
the enormous variation in rates of protection across countries and commodities, 
especially among the industrial countries. Simple solutions, such as the 
representative-weighting approach used in some versions of the MAcMAP database 
(Bouët et al. 2004), deal with the weighting problem without addressing the 
aggregation bias problem associated with nonlinearity in the costs of individual 
tariffs. In a recent paper, James Anderson (2006) proposes a new aggregation method 
that deals with both the aggregation bias and weighting problems while maintaining 
global payment balances, allowing it to be applied in future global CGE models.  
 
Product quality and variety differences 
 
A separate aggregation issue has to do with the fact that, within any product 
classification, there is a wide range of qualities and varieties available. The only way 
product quality or variety differences enter most CGE models is by distinguishing 
between a product‘s country of origin. This is done using so-called Armington 
elasticities which can ensure domestically produced goods are imperfect substitutes 
for imported goods in aggregate, and imports from one country are an imperfect 
substitute for goods imported from any other country (Armington 1969).  
In the real world, however, there is an ever-increasing array of qualities and 
varieties available for any product from each supplying country. It appears consumers 
(including producers using those products as intermediate inputs) are willing to pay 
for a greater variety of different quality products, even though that product 
differentiation may be costly in terms of shorter production runs and more 
advertising. Hummels and Klenow (2005) suggest that these improvements in quality 
are sufficiently rapid that the prices received by countries for the products that they 
continue to export—as distinct from their new exports—actually rise by 0.09 percent 
for each increase of 1 percent in national income. This result is strikingly at variance 
with traditional Armington models, which generate a reduction in export prices when 
economies grow and exports expand. 
Feenstra, Markusen and Zeile (1992) suggest the welfare cost of tariff 
protection can be underestimated by as much as a factor of ten when this 
consideration is not included in the analysis. Further evidence of the importance of 
this issue is provided by Broda and Weinstein (2006). In a study of US import data 
from 1972 to 2001, they find that the upward bias in the conventional import price 
index, because of not accounting for the growth in varieties of products, is 
approximately 1.2 percent per year, and estimate that the welfare gain from variety 
growth in US imports is 2.8 percent of GDP. Both computational capability and data 
improvements are needed before this can issue can be dealt with comprehensively in 
global CGE models. 
 






Standard models used to assess the implications of trade reforms are based on the 
assumption that expansion of exports following liberalization involves increasing the 
volume of the products initially being exported, but not of any other products. The 
Armington assumption also rules out expanding the markets to which goods are being 
supplied: if exports to a particular country are initially zero, then in most CGE models 
they remain zero following reform. 
Recent research, however, highlights the key role of the ― extensive‖ margin, 
where export expansion involves increases in the range of products exported 
(Hummels and Klenow 2005) and expansion in the range of markets supplied 
(Evenett and Venables 2002). Hummels and Klenow conclude that only about one-
third of the export expansion associated with economic growth comes from the 
― intensive margin‖ where greater quantities of the same products are exported. And 
Evenett and Venables find that about one-third of the expansion of exports from 
developing countries was obtained by exporting products to countries to which they 
had not previously exported.   
In a world where importers exhibit a preference for variety in the goods they 
purchase, these observations on the importance of extensive-margin growth have 
major implications. Increasing the volumes of the same products, as under the 
Armington assumption, has the inevitable consequence of driving down the price of 
exports and causing income losses to the exporter from deterioration in the terms of 
trade. Where exports are characterized by an expansion in the range of products 
supplied, the preference for variety exerts a counteracting force—helping to increase 
the demand for exports. In simulations introducing the Hummels-Klenow preference 
for variety in exports from China and India, Dimaranan, Ianchovichina and Martin 
(2007) found that the terms of trade for these exporters need not deteriorate 
significantly, despite very high projected rates of export growth. 
Some traditional treatments of new varieties, such as those based on 
monopolistic competition and a love-of-variety inspired by Krugman (1980), are 
typically implemented with agriculture and services as perfectly competitive sectors 
and the rest of the economy characterized as monopolistically competitive. However, 
as Rodrik (2004) notes, the process of discovering efficient new exports is just as 
important and difficult in agriculture and services as in manufacturing. Models 
developed by Melitz (2003), with a fixed cost of entry into export markets, provide a 
basis for modeling the endogenous emergence of new products. Again this is an area 
for future data and CGE model development. 
 
Distortions in markets for services 
 
The potential gains from trade liberalization in services are rarely considered in CGE 
models, or at best are included only in rather rudimentary ways. This is because of a 
lack of good data on bilateral services trade, and methodological difficulties in 
modelling distortions in services markets. This is a serious omission, since there are 
indications that the costs of barriers to trade in services may be much larger than the 
barriers presented by conventional trade measures such as tariffs and subsidies (Dee, 
Hanslow and Pham 2003).  
Konan and Maskus (2006) point out that the costs of services distortions are 
likely to be larger than those on merchandize trade because they typically involve 
restrictions not only on cross-border trade (Mode 1 of GATS), but also on supply by 
establishing enterprises in the country or by the movement of service suppliers 





of reform in services trade, when allowing for productivity growth in trading a wider 
range of qualities of goods as the quality of business services rise (following 
Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr 2006), completely dominate as a source of benefits 
from likely reforms following Russia‘s accession to the WTO. These methodological 
developments have begun to find their way into global CGE models, as reflected in 
the BKS study cited in Table 1, but much scope remains to improve services trade 
data and the measurement and modelling representation of services market 
distortions.  
  CGE models typically ignore the dynamics of financial capital markets. Trade 
expands the demand for international financial services to transfer the required 
payments and often to provide temporary credit. Trade reform thereby ‗thickens‘ 
international markets by raising not only the share of global goods production that 
passes through them which reduces the variation across time in prices for traded 
products) but also markets for international financial services to transfer the required 
payments and to provide temporary credit. Together these forces contribute to the 
long-term stability of financial markets. Openness also tends to reduce inflation. It can 
do so by increasing competition in domestic markets, which drives down prices and 
reduces political pressure on the central bank to inflate, and by providing more 
options for people to hold savings in foreign currencies, which reduces the ability of 
governments to inflate savings away (Rogoff 2003).  
   
Productivity-enhancing impacts of reform 
 
Economists have long been convinced that participation in international trade 
provides a bonus through improvements in productivity. Most of the investigation of 
these gains has been empirical, based loosely on Arrow‘s (1962) concept of learning-
by-doing. Major contributions to this literature include Feder (1983), Dollar (1992) 
and Sachs and Warner (1995), all of which find strong links between export 
performance and economic growth. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) raise concerns 
about the robustness of the estimated relationship between aggregate exports and 
productivity growth. During the same period, Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) 
questioned the learning-by-doing framework based on firm-level findings that 
exporting firms were more efficient before entering export markets, rather than 
because of learning-by-doing after entering these markets. 
More recent research on the aggregate links between exports and productivity 
growth has more carefully examined the potential endogeneity of the relationship, and 
continues to find an aggregate relationship (Frankel and Romer 1999). A number of 
subsequent firm-level studies have re-examined the relationship between exporting 
and growth, and have found evidence of productivity growth associated with learning-
by-doing after firms enter exporting. Blalock and Gertler (2004) find an increase in 
firm productivity of between 2 and 5 percent after Indonesian firms enter export 
markets. Fernandes and Isgut (2006) find evidence of an increase in productivity from 
learning-by-exporting when Colombian firms entered export markets. Van Biesebrock 
(2005) finds that African exporting firms had higher productivity before entering 
export markets, and that their productivity levels, and their subsequent rates of 
productivity growth, increased after entering export markets. Girma, Greenaway and 
Kneller (2004) also find both higher initial levels of productivity and higher 





To date the econometric literature on the growth benefits of trade 
liberalization provides little guidance on how long the dynamic effects from a one-off 
trade reform will last. This is yet another are requiring further empirical research. 
 
Modeling labor market and migration responses to immigrations restrictions 
 
Labor markets are very crudely modelled in global CGE models, partly for simplicity 
but also because of the difficulties in compiling internationally comparable data on skill 
levels and occupations. This problem is compounded when one abandons the 
assumption of no international labor flows and seeks to model the effects of altering 
restrictions on immigration. The approach adopted in the World Bank (2006) study 
cited above is but a start to addressing this issue, and much scope remains for further 
work in this area. More empirical research is needed also on the costs associated with 






The theory and available evidence surveyed above show that subsidies and trade 
barriers, including restrictions on the international movement of labor, are wasteful. 
Pre-announced, gradual reductions in them, especially if done multilaterally, would 
yield huge economic benefits and relatively little economic cost, and hence extremely 
high benefit/cost ratios. Moreover, such reforms would contribute enormously to 
reducing global inequality and poverty. Furthermore, while some social and 
environmental effects may be perceived as negative, many more will be positive. 
Even where some of those effects are harmful, there are almost always cheaper ways 
of obtaining better social and environmental outcomes than via trade and subsidy 
measures. The reasons these inefficient measures persist is partly lack of 
understanding of the benefits being foregone, but mostly it is because a small number 
of vested interests lobby for their retention (although in the case of immigration 
restrictions there is also opposition from some long-time citizens in high-income 
countries who believe their country is already at or beyond the optimal degree of 
cultural diversity).   
The challenge is to find politically feasible opportunities for ridding the world 
of subsidies and trade barriers and lowering immigration restrictions. This paper 
suggests the most obvious way is currently before us in the form of the Doha 
Development Agenda of multilateral trade negotiations under the World Trade 
Organization. Seizing that opportunity for reform could reduce government outlays by 
hundreds of millions of dollars, and make it less attractive to seek preferential trade 
agreements which are prone to making excluded countries worse off. A successful 
Doha outcome would also make it less pressing to lower immigration barriers insofar 
as trade in products is a substitute for international labor movements – although the 
estimated global gains and inequality-reducing consequences of more migration are so 
large as to make this worthwhile in addition (or at least as part of a Doha outcome 
under Mode IV of the services component). Cuts in subsidies and trade barriers also 
would provide a means for citizens to spend more on other pressing problems 
(because under freer trade the world‘s resources would be allocated more efficiently), 
thereby indirectly contributing to opportunities to alleviate other challenges facing the 





environmental degradation and address other challenges such as communicable 
diseases, conflicts and arms proliferation, education under-investment, and hunger 
and malnutrition. All that is needed is the political will to agree to and implement 
such reforms. If that is not found for concluding the global Doha round soon, and 
given that far lower net benefits will flow from sub-global preferential trade 
agreements (especially for citizens of left-out countries) and the potentially huge 
benefits from migration (especially for citizens of today‘s developing countries), it 
would not be surprising if demands for visas and work permits intensifies along with 






Appendix: The global, economy-wide GTAP database and the GTAP 
and LINKAGE CGE models 
 
To estimate the potential economy-wide effects of regional and multilateral trade 
liberalizations, by far the most common methodology since the 1980s has involved global 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models and databases.
39 It is a daunting task to 
compile and periodically update all the necessary data for such a model so, under the 
direction of Professor Tom Hertel of Purdue University, a consortium was established 
more than a decade ago for this purpose. Known as GTAP (the Global Trade Analysis 
Project), it is currently providing Version 6 of its database publicly (with a pre-release of 
Version 7 now under review by consortium members). That database provides reconciled 
production, consumption and bilateral goods and services trade data plus subsidies and 
trade distortion estimates
40 (including developing country preferences) as of 2001 for 
more than 80 countries or country groups spanning the world, each divided into 57 
sectors spanning the entire economy (see www.gtap.org). Earlier versions based on 1997 
or 1995 data had less country and product disaggregation and did not include tariff 
preferences. This database is the foundation of most global CGE trade models in use 
today. Version 6 is described in detail in Dimaranan (2006). 
In addition, the GTAP Center at Purdue University has developed its own family 
of applied general equilibrium models (Hertel 1997). The core GTAP model is a standard, 
multi-region CGE model that is currently being used by more than one thousand 
researchers in scores of countries on five continents. (The GTAP database builds on 
contributions from many of these individuals, as well as the national and international 
agencies in the GTAP Consortium.) Perfect competition and constant returns to scale are 
assumed for all sectors of each economy in the core comparative static version.  
The GTAP model utilizes a sophisticated representation of consumer demands that 
allows for differences in both the price and income responsiveness of demand in different 
regions depending upon both the level of development of the region and the particular 
consumption patterns observed in that region. On the supply-side, differences in factor 
endowments within and between countries interact with different sectoral factor intensities 
to drive changes in the sectoral composition of output in response to structural or policy 
shocks. The GTAP production system distinguishes sectors by their intensities in five 
primary factors of production: agricultural land, other natural resources, unskilled labor 
time, skilled labor time, and physical capital. Thus in a region where physical capital is 
accumulating rapidly relative to other factors, for example, that region‘s relatively capital 
intensive sectors tend to expand at the expense of other sectors. In addition to differences in 
intermediate input intensities, import intensities are also permitted to vary across uses. 
Since much trade is in intermediate inputs, the distinction between sales to final consumers 
and sales to other firms can be important. Lowering the cost of imported goods to 
consumers is quite different from lowering the cost of intermediate inputs to domestic firms 
that may be competing with imports in the final product market. As well, products are 
differentiated by place of production. The linkage between the different prices of a product 
is typically quite strong, but will depend on the degree of substitutability in consumption. In 
addition to matching up more effectively with reality, this approach has the advantage of 
permitting bilateral trade to be tracked, as opposed to simply reporting total exports net of 
imports. 
                                                 
39 On the need for adopting a general rather than partial equilibrium methodology, see Anderson 
(2002). 
40 Estimating the height of trade barriers is a non-trivial task in itself, even for merchandise (Evans 
2003) but especially for services (Findlay and Warren 2001) and if technical barriers to trade are 





The LINKAGE model has been developed for use by the World Bank‘s global 
economic projections team (van der Mensbrugghe 2005). It is a relatively 
straightforward CGE model but with some characteristics that distinguish it from 
standard comparative static models such as the GTAP model. A key difference is that 
it is recursive, so while it starts with 2001 as its base year it can be solved annually 
through to 2015. The dynamics are driven by exogenous population and labor supply 
growth, savings-driven capital accumulation, and labor-augmenting technological 
progress (as assumed for the World Bank‘s global economic prospects exercise, see 
World Bank 2004, 2005). In any given year, factor stocks are fixed. Producers 
minimize costs subject to constant returns to scale production technology, consumers 
maximize utility, and all markets – including for labor – are cleared with flexible 
prices. There are three types of production structures. Crop sectors reflect the 
substitution possibility between extensive and intensive farming. Livestock sectors 
reflect the substitution possibility between intensive versus pasture feeding. And all 
other sectors reflect standard capital/labor substitution (with two types of labor: 
skilled and unskilled). As in the GTAp model there is a single representative 
household per modeled region, allocating income to consumption using the extended 
linear expenditure system. Trade is modeled using a nested Armington structure for 
each product, in which aggregate import demand is the outcome of allocating 
domestic absorption between the domestically produced good and aggregate imports 
of that product, and then that aggregate import demand is allocated across source 
countries to determine the pattern of bilateral trade flows. Government fiscal balances 
are fixed in any given year, with the fiscal objective being met by changing the level 
of lump sum taxes on households. This implies that losses of tariff revenues are 
replaced frictionlessly by higher direct taxes on households. The current account 
balance also is fixed. For example, if import tariffs are reduced, the propensity to 
import increases and additional imports are financed by increasing export revenues. 
The latter typically is achieved by a real exchange rate depreciation. Finally, 
investment is driven by savings. With fixed public and foreign saving, investment 
comes from changes in the savings behavior of the domestic household and from 
changes in the unit cost of investment. The latter can play an important role in a 
dynamic model if imported capital goods are taxed. Because the capital account is 
exogenous, rates of return across countries can differ over time and across 
simulations. The model only solves for relative prices, with the numéraire, or price 
anchor, being the export price index of manufactured exports from high-income 
countries. This price is fixed at unity in the base year and throughout the projection 
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Sources: Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006a, Table 12.4); Brown, Kiyota and Stern (2005, Table 4); Harrison, Rutherford and 
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World  15.2      9.3  3.1 
High-income  15.9      7.3  1.2 
Australia & NZ  2.6  0.3  3.3  13.9  4.1 
EU25 + EFTA   13.9  13.2  14.7  5.1  1.7 
United States  2.4  2.3  2.5  9.6  0.9 
Canada  9.0  1.2  14.1  8.7  0.5 
Japan  29.3  48.0  20.8  9.0  0.4 
S. Korea & Taiwan  53.0  84.5  22.4  9.2  3.6 
Hong Kong & Sing.  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0 
           
Developing countries  14.2      14.3  7.1 
Middle-income  12.1      13.6  6.0 
Argentina  7.1  5.6  7.8  11.1  10.1 
Brazil  5.0  2.4  9.0  14.7  9.7 
China  10.3  9.9  11.0  9.6  5.5 
Mexico  10.3  10.8  9.7  7.8  4.3 
Russia  13.5  14.6  12.8  15.8  7.8 
South Africa  8.6  5.9  10.6  21.9  5.4 
Thailand  16.7  12.7  19.2  16.4  7.6 
Turkey  16.6  16.4  17.0  3.8  1.2 
Rest of East Asia  13.4  18.6  9.0  8.7  3.5 
Rest of LAC  10.8  9.2  11.8  12.9  8.4 
Rest of ECA  15.7  10.4  19.5  9.3  3.2 
M. East &N. Africa  13.1  8.2  18.3  23.9  7.2 
           
Low-income  22.0      17.9  14.1 
Bangladesh  12.7  7.4  21.2  29.9  16.2 
India  49.9  25.7  75.6  26.5  24.2 
Indonesia  5.0  4.3  6.2  8.0  4.3 
Vietnam  37.1  13.1  44.8  29.1  12.3 
Rest of South Asia  21.1  14.2  32.0  6.6  14.3 
Selected SSAfrica
a  11.8  10.2  13.0  12.5  7.5 
Rest of SSAfrica  21.2  18.0  23.6  26.2  14.0 
       Rest of the World  11.8  1.9  18.7  5.6  8.9 
 
a The Selected Sub-Saharan African countries (for which national modules are 
available in the LINKAGE Model) include Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
Source: Projections from the GTAP database Version 6.05 using the World Bank‘s 





Table 3: Impacts on real income from full liberalization of global merchandise trade, 
by country/region, 2015 
 








income due just 
to change in 
terms of trade 
($billion) 
Gain due to 
improved 
efficiency of 
resource use net 
of terms of trade 
effect 
($billion) 





         
Australia and New Zealand  6.1  3.5  2.6  1.0   (0.4) 
EU 25 plus EFTA  65.2  0.5  64.7  0.6   (0.6) 
United States  16.2  10.7  6.5  0.1   (0.0) 
Canada  3.8  -0.3  4.1  0.4   (0.4) 
Japan  54.6  7.5  47.1  1.1   (1.0) 
Korea and Taiwan  44.6  0.4  44.2  3.5   (3.5) 
Hong Kong and Singapore  11.2  7.9  3.3  2.6   (0.8) 
Argentina  4.9  1.2  3.7  1.2   (0.9) 
Bangladesh  0.1  -1.1  1.2  0.2   (2.4) 
Brazil  9.9  4.6  5.3  1.5   (0.8) 
China  5.6  -8.3  13.9  0.2   (0.5) 
India  3.4  -9.4  12.8  0.4   (1.5) 
Indonesia  1.9  0.2  1.7  0.7   (0.7) 
Thailand  7.7  0.7  7.0  3.8   (3.4) 
Vietnam  3.0  -0.2  3.2  5.2   (5.5) 
Russia  2.7  -2.7  5.4  0.6   (1.2) 
Mexico  3.6  -3.6  7.2  0.4   (0.8) 
South Africa  1.3  0.0  1.3  0.9   (0.9) 
Turkey  3.3  0.2  3.1  1.3   (1.2) 
Rest of South Asia  1.0  -0.8  1.8  0.5   (0.9) 
Rest of East Asia  5.3  -0.9  6.2  1.9   (2.2) 
Rest of LAC  10.3  0.0  10.3  1.2   (1.2) 
Rest of ECA  1.0  -1.6  2.6  0.3   (0.8) 
Middle East and North Africa  14.0  -6.4  20.4  1.2   (1.7) 
Selected SSA countries
b  1.0  0.5  0.5  1.5   (0.8) 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  2.5  -2.3  4.8  1.1   (2.2) 
Rest of the World  3.4  0.1  3.3  1.5   (1.5) 
High-income countries  201.6  30.3  171.3  0.6   (0.5) 
Developing countries   85.7  -29.7  115.4  0.8   (1.1) 
     Middle-income countries  69.5  -16.7  86.2  0.8   (1.0) 
     Low-income countries  16.2  -12.9  29.1  0.8   (1.4) 
   East Asia and Pacific  23.5  -8.5  32.0  0.7   (1.0) 
   South Asia  4.5  -11.2  15.7  0.4   (1.4) 
   Europe and Central Asia  7.0  -4.0  11.0  0.7   (1.1) 
   Sub-Saharan Africa  4.8  -1.8  6.6  1.1   (1.5) 
   Latin America and the Carib  28.7  2.2  26.5  1.0   (0.9) 
World total  287.3  0.6  286.7  0.7   (0.7) 
 
a Numbers in parentheses refer to that due to efficiency gains net of terms of trade 
effects. 
b Selected Sub-Saharan African countries include Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 





Table 4: Regional and sectoral source of gains from full liberalization of global 
merchandise trade, developing and high-income countries, 2015 
 
(relative to the baseline scenario) 
 
  Gains by region in $billion  Percent of regional gain 









income  World 
             
Developing countries liberalize:             
Agriculture and food  28  19  47  33  9  17 
Textiles and clothing  9  14  23  10  7  8 
Other merchandise  6  52  58  7  26  20 
All sectors  43  85  128  50  42  45 
             
High-income countries liberalize:             
Agriculture and food  26  109  135  30  54  47 
Textiles and clothing  13  2  15  15  1  5 
Other merchandise  4  5  9  5  3  3 
All sectors  43  116  159  50  58  55 
             
All countries liberalize:             
Agriculture and food  54  128  182  63  63  63 
Textiles and clothing  22  16  38  25  8  14 
Other merchandise  10  57  67  12  29  23 
All sectors  86  201  287  100  100  100 
 
a Small interaction effects are distributed proportionately and numbers are rounded to 
sum to 100 percent. 
 






Table 5: Impact of full liberalization of high-income countries‘ food and agric import 
barriers and subsidies on indexes of real





                                                           Export prices                         Import prices  










Sub-Saharan Africa  2.5  1.2    4.3  0.4   
   South Africa  1.0  0.7    3.5  0.4   
   Other Southern Africa  4.1  3.2    2.8  0.5   
   Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  2.2  1.1    4.8  0.3   
 
 
a Relative to the numeraire which in this version of the LINKAGE model is the price of 
high-income countries‘ exports of manufactures. 
 
 





Table 6: Terms of trade‘s contribution to real income changes from full liberalization 
of high-income countries‘ food and agric import barriers and subsidies, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 2015 
 
(in 2001 billion US dollars) 
 
                                                                        Change in regional welfare due to: 







Sum of export 
and import 
price effects 
Agric and food products – all SSA  0.94  -0.38  0.56 
       South Africa  0.05  -0.09  -0.04 
       Other Southern Africa  0.36  -0.03  0.33 
       Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.53  -0.25  0.28 
       
Non-agricultural products – all SSA  1.45  -0.53  0.92 
       South Africa  0.35  -0.15  0.20 
       Other Southern Africa  0.37  -0.10  0.27 
       Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.72  -0.29  0.43 
       
 
a The numbers in this column have the opposite sign to the import price indexes in 
Table 5 because an import price rise reduces real income (whereas numbers in the 
export columns have the same sign). 
 






Table 7: Comparative static estimates of economic welfare gains from partial trade 
and subsidy reform under the Doha Development Agenda, 2015
a 
 
(in 2001 US billion dollars) 
 
 
                                                                                           Scenarios: 
 























Low-income countries  0.1  12.5  17.1 
Middle-income countries  -0.5  16.1  22.7 
High-income countries  18.1  79.2  96.4 
       
TOTAL, World  17.7  96.1  119.3 
    (=0.2% of GDP)   
 
a For specifics of scenarios, see text (SDT = Special and Differential Treatment: two-
thirds cuts by developing countries and none by Least Developed Countries). 
 






Table 8: Comparative static estimates of economic welfare gains from an FTAA 
compared with global liberalization of goods and services trade 
 
(in 2001 US billion dollars) 
 
(a) BKS study (goods and services reform)
a 
  FTAA  Unilateral free 
trade by the 
Americas 




United States and Canada  79  403  641 
Latin America and Caribbean  49  113  172 
Total, Americas  128  516  813 
Rest of world  -10  364  1803 
TOTAL, WORLD  118  880  2616 




(b) HRTG study (goods reform only)
b 













United States and Canada  3  2  4  6 
Latin America and Caribbean  11  31  15  8 
Total, Americas  14  33  19  14 
European Union  -3  23  43  31 
Japan  -1  -1  50  24 
Other countries  -5  -5  93  27 
TOTAL, WORLD  5  50  205  96 
         
 
a Values shown have been inflated from their reported 1995 values to 2001 values 
assuming 2 percent inflation per year (the change in the United States‘ GDP Deflator). 
 
b Values shown have been inflated from their reported 1996 values to 2001 values 
assuming 2 percent inflation per year (the change in the United States‘ GDP Deflator). 
 
c Taken from Scenario 7 in Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006a, Table 
12.14), as discussed in the text. 
 
Sources: Brown, Kiyota and Stern (2005, Table 4) and Harrison, Rutherford, Tarr and 





Table 9: Global labor force structure, 2001 and projected to 2025 without and with 
assumed extra migration 
(millions) 
 
















Developing countries (DCs):           
    Unskilled labor  2396  3294  3284  -9.8  -0.3 
    Skilled labor  200  267  263  -4.5  -1.7 
  TOTAL, DC LABOR  2596  3561  3547  -14.2  -0.4 
           
High-income countries (HICs):           
  DC migrant workers:           
      Unskilled labor  24.7  25.3  35.1  9.8  39 
      Skilled labor  3.1  3.2  7.7  4.5  138 
      Total DC migrant workers  27.8  28.5  14.3  14.2  50 
  TOTAL, HIC LABOR   480.8  474.0  488.2  14.2  3 
           
 
 






Table 10: Comparative static estimates of economic welfare effects of a boost to 
international worker migration, 2025 
 
(in 2001 US billion dollars) 
 
  $ billion  Share 
 (percent) 
New migrants  481  71 
Natives (non-migrants) in developing countries  143  21 
   TOTAL, current DC citizens  624  92 
     
Natives in high-income countries  138  21 
Recent migrants in high-income countries  -88  -13 
   TOTAL, current HIC citizens  50  8 
     
WORLD TOTAL  674  100 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2006, Table 2.3).  Table 11: Net present value of benefits and costs to 2100, and benefit/cost ratios, from liberalizing subsidies and trade barriers globally under the 
WTO‘s Doha Development Agenda, and liberalizing migration 
 
(in 2001 US billion dollars) 
 
                         
   Trade reform benefit/cost ratio including dynamic gains           
   3% discount rate  6% discount rate                 
   Low  High  Low  High                 
Global  1121  932  363  269                 
Developing  3147  2724  895  692                 
                          
   Trade reform costs and benefits including dynamic gains (NPV 2008)         
   3% discount rate  6% discount rate 
   Low  High  Low  High 
   GB  C  NB  GB  C  NB  GB  C  NB  GB  C  NB 
Global  172666  154  172512  424495  456  424039  51485  142  51343  113028  420  112607 
Developing  161583  51  161532  419477  154  419323  42355  47  42308  98215  142  98073 
                         
                         
   Migration reform benefit/cost ratio without dynamic gains            
   3% discount rate  6% discount rate                 
   Low  High  Low  High                 
Global  336  112  137  45                 
Developing  838  279  299  100                 
                          
   Migration reform costs and benefits without dynamic gains (NPV 2008)         
   3% discount rate  6% discount rate 
   Low  High  Low  High 
   GB  C  NB  GB  C  NB  GB  C  NB  GB  C  NB 





Developing  47197  56  47141  47197  169  47028  13628  46  13582  13628  137  13491 
                          
                         
   Trade reform benefit/cost ratio without dynamic gains             
   3% discount rate  6% discount rate                 
   Low  High  Low  High                 
Global  47  80  17  28                 
Developing  68  113  21  35                 
                          
   Trade reform costs and benefits without dynamic gains (NPV 2008)         
   3% discount rate  6% discount rate 
   Low  High  Low  High 
   GB  C  NB  GB  C  NB  GB  C  NB  GB  C  NB 
Global  7260  154  7106  36298  456  35842  2371  142  2229  11856  420  11436 
Developing  3473  51  3422  17367  154  17212  981  47  933  4903  142  4761 
                         
                         
   Trade and migration reform benefit/cost ratio without dynamic gains          
   3% discount rate  6% discount rate                 
   Low  High  Low  High                 
Global  169  93  64  35                 
Developing  471  200  157  66                 
                          
   Trade and migration reform costs and benefits without dynamic gains (NPV 2008)       
   3% discount rate  6% discount rate 
   Low  High  Low  High 
   GB  C  NB  GB  C  NB  GB  C  NB  GB  C  NB 
Global  45112  267  44845  74150  794  73356  14827  233  14594  24312  694  23618 
Developing  50670  108  50562  64563  323  64240  14609  93  14516  18531  279  18252 
 
Source: Authors‘ calculations based on assumptions in text Figure 1: Undiscounted increments through to 2100 of world and developing country 
incomes without reform, with a Doha trade policy reform (without extra migration), 
and with extra migration (without Doha)  
 
(high net gains cases, world in dark lines and developing countries in light lines, 













2008 2018 2028 2038 2048 2058 2068 2078 2088 2098
$ 
trillion
With trade policy reform incl. dynamic gains                                 
(black  = world, grey  = developing countires) 
Without trade policy reform or extra migration                               
(black  = world, grey  = developing countires) 
With migration policy reform
 
 





Figure 2: Net present value of discounted annual increments to world and developing 
country incomes to 2100 from migration reform and frmo trade policy reform (with 
and without dynamic gains)  
 
(high net gains cases, in US billion dollars per year, using a discount rate of 6 percent 
p.a. to express it in 2008 present value terms) 
 












With trade reform, incl dynamic
gains





























Source: Authors‘ estimates underlying Table 11‘s High Net Gains cases 